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from the Ryder Sources, 50 U Chi L Rev 1 (1983); John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial
before the Lawyers, 45 U Chi L Rev 263 (1978); John H. Langbein, The English Criminal
Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution and Thomas A. Green, The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-Finding Traditions on the Eve of the French Revolution, both
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United States during the two hundred years following the enactment of the Bill of Rights has been the subject of astonishing
scholarly neglect. With the exception of a useful "historical
perspective" in a collection of essays on the contemporary jury'
and a practitioner's historical encomium to the jury,4 we have
been unable to find anything resembling a general history of the
American jury in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We
hope that even a sketch of the jury's transformation during these
centuries will be useful.5
Our central theme is that as the jury's composition became
more democratic, its role in American civic life declined.6 We
suggest neither cause nor effect, merely irony.' Section I of this
article briefly reviews the colonial background of the constitutional right to jury trial. Section II chronicles changes in the composition of the jury. Unpropertied white men, initially excluded
from jury service, became jurors fairly rapidly. African-American
men, members of other minority groups, and women were included only after long struggles. Section III describes the disappearance of the American jury's de jure power to decide issues of law.
It concludes that abandonment of the jury's formal law-judging
power should be seen as part of a continuing cycle of rejection
and return to "book law." Section IV examines the radical curtailment of the role of the jury through the practice of plea bargaining.
We have not begun to address all of the important alterations in the criminal jury trial during the past two hundred
years. Among the topics that we have not considered are: (1)

Early Connecticut 67-100 (North Carolina, 1987); John M. Murrin, Magistrates,Sinners,
and a PrecariousLiberty: Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century New England, in David D.
Hall, John M. Murrin, and Thad W. Tate, eds, Saints and Revolutionaries: Essays on
Early American History 152 (Norton, 1984).
' Harold M. Hyman and Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in Rita James Simon, ed, The Jury System in America: A Critical Overview 21 (Sage,
1975).
" Lloyd E. Moore, The Jury: Tool of Kings, Palladium of Liberties (Anderson, 2d ed
1988).
' Although we focus primarily on the criminal jury, we have drawn on literature concerning the civil jury when this literature seemed illuminating.
' Joan Hoff has advanced a similar thesis concerning the history of the legal status
of women in the United States. She argues that by the time women gained new rights,
the importance of these rights had often diminished. See Joan Hoff, Law, Gender, and
Injustice:A Legal History of U.S. Women 3-9 (NYU, 1991).
' The evidence does not permit a stronger claim. In the absence of express declarations that more democratic juries should have fewer powers, it is unclear what data would
establish a causal relationship between these two developments.
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changes in the extent to which professional judges have channelled and controlled jury decisions by creating and applying
rules of evidence, commenting on the evidence at trial, directing
verdicts of acquittal, instructing juries, determining the length
and conditions of jury deliberations, questioning jurors about
their verdicts, and granting new trials; (2) the origin of the
practice of impaneling a jury to hear only one case rather than a
series of cases; (3) the role taken by jurors in the trial process,
particularly through questioning witnesses; (4) the transformation of jury instructions from wide-ranging, informal addresses to
standardized, written, technical, and frequently incomprehensible
statements of the law;8 (5) the expansion and contraction of the
voir dire examination of prospective jurors;9 (6) the appearance
and disappearance of the "blue ribbon" jury; (7) the "incorporation" of the right to jury trial in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause; (8) the authorization of juries of fewer than
twelve and of nonunanimous verdicts in criminal cases; (9) the
substitution of random methods of choosing jury venires for
discretionary selection by public officials; and (10) the authorization of the bench trial as an alternative to jury trial.
Books remain to be written on these topics as well as on the
topics that we have considered. The changes that have occurred
in the criminal jury since ratification of the Sixth Amendment
have been as dramatic and significant as earlier developments
that have been studied more carefully. We would be pleased if
our narrative were to help or provoke others to tell the story
more fully. °

I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
In 1791, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed every federal
criminal defendant the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
This Amendment was essentially redundant. Article IH, § 2 of

' For a discussion of this transformation, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and
Punishment in American History 245-47 (Basic, 1993).
" See id at 243-44.
10 Harold Hyman and Catherine Tarrant wrote in 1975 that "research into American
jury history has been far from adequate, systematic, or synthetic .... The result is that
any attempt to survey jury history... is necessarily impressionistic, discursive, and

tentative." These authors concluded, "Few areas of legal history need attention more."
Hyman and Tarrant, American Trial Jury History at 24 (cited in note 3). See also Murrin,
Magistrates, Sinners, and a PrecariousLiberty at 153 (cited in note 2) ("[The jury] has
almost completely eluded sustained scholarly attention.m").
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the Constitution had already provided, "The trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."1 ' The right
to jury trial in criminal cases was among the few guarantees of
individual rights enumerated in the Constitution of 1789,12 and
it was the only guarantee to appear in both the original document and the Bill of Rights."
Even before the Declaration of Independence, the First Continental Congress's Declaration of Rights of 1774 had proclaimed
the right to jury trial.'4 Twelve states had enacted written constitutions prior to the Constitutional Convention, and the only
right that these twelve constitutions declared unanimously was
the right of a criminal defendant to jury trial. 5

"' In light of the Seventh Amendment's recognition of a right to jury trial in civil
cases, the framers of the Bill of Rights may have thought it prudent to reiterate in an
adjacent Amendment the right to jury trial in criminal cases.
Unlike Article III, § 2, the Sixth Amendment declared expressly that the jury must
be impartial. It also added to Article i's requirement that the trial occur "in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed" a further requirement that the jury be
drawn from the "district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Anti-Federalists
had criticized the language of Article III for its failure to confine vicinage more narrowly.
See Francis H. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: A
Study in ConstitutionalDevelopment 25 (Kansas, 1951); Hyman and Tarrant, American
Trial Jury History at 33-34 (cited in note 3).
' Apart from Article III's jury-trial guarantee, Article I prohibits both Congress and
the states from enacting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws; it prohibits the states
from impairing the obligations of contract; and it forbids suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus except when the "public safety may require it." US Const, Art I, §§ 9-10. Article
III, § 3 requires the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in
open court as a prerequisite to a conviction for treason, and it declares that the punishment for treason may not include corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the
lifetime of the person convicted. Article IV, § 1 requires each state to accord full faith and
credit to the judgments of other states. Section 2 of Article IV provides that the citizens of
each state must be accorded the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.
11 Less explicitly, the First Amendment may have reiterated Article VI's prohibition
of religious tests for office-holding. See Torcaso v Watkins, 367 US 488, 491-93 (1961).
14 1 Journals of the Continental Congress: 1774-1789 69 (Oct 14, 1774) (US GPO,
1904).
1" Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in Leonard W. Levy, ed, Essays on the Making of
the Constitution 258, 269 (Oxford, 2d ed 1987). Guarantee of the right to jury trial in
America was in fact older than the first English settlement on this continent. James rs
Charter to the Virginia Company in 1606 promised the colonists who would settle Jamestown a year later that they would enjoy all the rights of Englishmen, including the right
to jury trial. See Hyman and Tarrant, American Trial Jury History at 24 (cited in note 3).
Nevertheless, until the mid-eighteenth century, the use of juries seems to have been infrequent in Virginia. Then the number of jury trials in each Virginia county increased
from about three or four per year to about twenty or thirty. A. G. Roeber, FaithfulMagistrates and Republican Lawyers: Creatorsof Virginia Legal Culture, 1680-1810 128 (North
Carolina, 1981).
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At the Constitutional Convention, the desirability of safeguarding the jury may have been the most consistent point of
agreement between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 83:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if
they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they
set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a
valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the
very palladium of free government."
The framers' enthusiastic support for the jury stemmed in
large measure from the role that juries had played in resisting
English authority before the Revolution. 7 The most noted of the
colonial cases was that of John Peter Zenger, a New York printer
whose trial on charges of seditious libel occurred forty-one years
before the drafting of the Declaration of Independence."
16

Federalist 83 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 491, 499

(Penguin, 1961).
' Criminal jury trials in America became more frequent in the eighteenth century
than they had been in the seventeenth century. Yet, especially in the seventeenth century, American colonies varied greatly in their use of criminal juries. Among the New
England colonies, rights-conscious Rhode Island was at one extreme, routinely affording
jury trials in all criminal prosecutions for offenses more serious than drunkenness. See
Murrin, Magistrates, Sinners, and a PrecariousLiberty at 167 (cited in note 2). At the
other extreme, New Haven magistrates sought to replace English law with "the judiciall
lawes of God" and effectively dispensed with jury trials until about 1665. Id at 170, 173.
Most New England colonies routinely employed juries in capital cases. Despite
formal declarations that the right to jury trial extended "to all persons in Criminall
cases," New England jury trials in non-capital cases were infrequent. (At common law, the
category of capital crimes included all felonies, but some colonies excluded most of the
property crimes punished as felonies in England while including crimes like adultery,
public masturbation, and cursing or smiting a parent.) John Murrin observed, "In New
England court records, one reads little about felonies and misdemeanors but a great deal
concerning sin, evil, wickedness, filthiness, pollutions, and the like .... The proper
response to sin in New England was confession and repentance, not denial of guilt." Even
a defendant's request for a copy of his indictment was sometimes regarded as "smiteing at
the authority of God." Id at 174, 188. Compare the twentieth-century plea bargaining
practices described in the text accompanying notes 276-305. Although the use of juries in
criminal cases in the New England colonies increased over time, use of the jury to resolve
civil lawsuits in Connecticut became far less frequent in the eighteenth century than it
had been in the seventeenth. Mann, Neighbors and Strangers at 67-100 (cited in note 2).
Outside of New England, juries were frequently used in seventeenth century Pennsylvania, West Jersey, and North Carolina, but not in Maryland, New Netherland, and
Virginia. Murrin, Magistrates,Sinners, and a PrecariousLiberty at 154.
" The surviving accounts of Zenger's trial are probably partisan, but whether fair or
slanted, these accounts greatly influenced the founders' views of the jury. The primary
sources are James Alexander, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter
Zenger, Printerof The New York Weekly Journal (Harvard, 1963); Stephen Botein, ed, 'Mr.
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Zenger's paper, The New York Weekly Journal, was the first
journal of political criticism in America. After William Cosby, the
newly appointed royal Governor of New York, removed Lewis
Morris from his position as Chief Justice, Morris and his supporters established
the journal and hired Zenger as its editor and
19
printer.
The paper directed most of its barbs toward Cosby and his
cohorts. Zenger's complaints (including the objection that trials
by jury were taken away when the governor pleased) would seem
within the bounds of legitimate political criticism today, but in
the eighteenth century they qualified as seditious libel, a criminal act. Despite Zenger's evident guilt, three separate grand
juries refused to indict. In a widely condemned action, New
York's Attorney General then filed an information charging
Zenger with libel.2"
Zenger was imprisoned for eight months before trial. James
De Lancey, Morris's successor as Chief Justice, set bail at the
unprecedented and unattainable sum of four hundred pounds
sterling.2 ' Shortly before the trial was to begin, Zenger's lawyers
sought to disqualify De Lancey from conducting it. The lawyers
objected that because De Lancey held his office "during pleasure"
of the Crown, he lacked the independence required by English
law.' De Lancey rejected the lawyers' requests that he disqualify himself-and also disbarred the lawyers. He appointed a
Cosby supporter, John Chambers, to represent Zenger at trial.
Following Chambers's opening argument, a man "rose dramatically from his chair in the City Hall courtroom, and an23
nounced.., that he would participate in Zenger's defense."
Riding to the rescue was Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia, widely regarded as the foremost lawyer in the colonies and described

Zenger's Malice and Falshood" Six Issues of the New York Weekly Journal, 1733-34
(American Antiquarian Society, 1985). We also rely on these secondary sources: Stanley
N. Katz, Introduction,in Alexander, A BriefNarratieat 1; Stephen Botein, Introduction,
in Botein, ed, 'Mr.Zenger'sMalice and Falshood' at 5; Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case:
Prototype of a Political Trial, in Michal R. Belknap, ed, American Political Trials 21
(Greenwood, 1981).
19 Katz, Introduction at 4-8. Chief Justice Morris had ruled against Cosby in a
financial dispute. Id at 4.
'o Id at 17-19. At about the same time, the Governor's council ordered several issues
of the Journalcondemned and burned. Id at 18.
21 Id at 18-19.
' Parliament, perhaps motivated both by the paucity of law-trained judges in the
colonies and by its fear of judicial independence, had denied colonial judges the life tenure
generally afforded English judges. Id at 18-21.
SId at 22.
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by a"2contemporary
as "possessed of a confidence no terrors could
4
awe.
Hamilton conceded Zenger's publication of the papers but
claimed that truth was a defense. Under the "law on the
books," this argument was unsound. The well-established rule
was: The greater the truth, the greater the libel.26 Chief Justice
De Lancey responded, "A libel is not to be justified; for it is
nevertheless a libel that it is true."2 7
Hamilton maintained that the issue was not for De Lancey
to decide. It belonged to the jury. The Chief Justice disputed the
point:
[Tihe jury may find that Zenger printed and published those
papers, and leave it to the Court to judge whether they are
libelous; you know this is very common; it is in the nature of
a special verdict, where the jury leave the matter of law to
the Court.'
Hamilton answered:
I know... the jury may do so; but I do likewise know they
may do otherwise. I know they have the right beyond all
dispute to determine both the law and the fact, and where
they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so ....
[Lleaving it to the judgment of the Court whether the words
are libelous or not in effect renders juries useless ......
Chief Justice De Lancey apparently acquiesced in Hamilton's
position to a degree. Although he told the jurors that truth was
no defense, he did permit them to return a general verdict. The
announcement of Zenger's acquittal brought "three huzzas" from
spectators in the courtroom. 0
Accounts of the trial appeared in newspapers throughout the
colonies and in the Zenger press's pamphlet, A Brief Narrative of
the Case and Trial of John PeterZenger, Printerof the New York
24 Id at 21. James Alexander, one of Zenger's original attorneys, apparently had

retained Hamilton. Id. See also Alexander, A BriefNarrativeat 61 (cited in note 18).
25 Alexander, A BriefNarrativeat 62; Katz, Introduction at 23 (cited in note 18).
' See William Hawkins, 1 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 194 (Garland, 1978)
(reprint of the 1716 original) ("[lilt is far from being a Justification of a Libel, that the
Contents thereof are true ... since the greater Appearance there is of Truth in any
malicious Invective, so much the more provoking it is.").
Alexander, A BriefNarrativeat 69.

Id at 78 (footnote omitted).
Id (emphasis omitted).
30 Id at 101.
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3 ' In the
Weekly Journal.
half-century between Zenger's trial and
the ratification of the Sixth Amendment, this pamphlet was reprinted fourteen times.3 2 More than any formal law book, it became the American primer on the role and duties of jurors.
Zenger's trial was not an aberration; during the pre-Revolutionary period, juries and grand juries all but nullified the law of
seditious libel in the colonies. Hundreds of defendants were convicted of this crime in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 3 but there seem to have been no more than a
half-dozen prosecutions and only two convictions in America
throughout the colonial period. 4 Grand juries were reluctant to
indict and petit juries reluctant to convict.
Juries hindered the enforcement of other English laws as
well. 5 One Massachusetts governor complained, "A Custom
house officer has no chance with a jury,"" and another protested, "[A] trial by jury here is only trying one illicit trader by his
fellows, or at least by his well-wishers."37
As juries exonerated those who resisted English colonial
policy, they harassed those who enforced it. In one case, when an
accused smuggler's ship was seized, the shipowner settled in an
admiralty court (a nonjury court), paying five hundred pounds
sterling to recover his vessel. The shipowner, Erving, then sued
the customs officer, Cradock, who had seized his ship. In a civil
trespass action, a jury awarded Erving one hundred pounds in
excess of the amount that he had paid. An appellate court set
aside the verdict on the ground that "the decree of the Court of
Admiralty, where it had jurisdiction, could not be traversed and
annulled in a court of common law." 8 Nevertheless, a second

31

Katz, Introduction at 26.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv L Rev 932, 946-47

(1919).
' Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Freedom of the Press In England 1476-1776. The Rise and
Decline of Government Controls 365 (illinois, 1952).
' Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 17 (Oxford, 1985); Harold L. Nelson,
Seditious Libel in ColonialAmerica, 3 Am J Legal Hist 160 (1959).
' See Reid, In a Defiant Stance at 27-40 (cited in note 2); John Phillip Reid, In a
Rebellious Spirit: The Argument of Facts, the Liberty Riot, and the Coming of the American Revolution 30-33 (Penn State, 1979).
' Quincy's MassachusettsBay Reports, 1761-1772 557 n4 (Little, Brown, 1865) (letter
from Governor Francis Bernard to Lords of Trade, Aug 21, 1761), quoted in Akhil Reed
Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,107 Harv L Rev 757, 777 (1994).
Governor William Shirley, quoted in Stephen Botein, Early American Law and
Society 57 (Knopf, 1983).
' Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson, quoted in Reid, In A Defiant Stance at 31 (cited
in note 2).
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jury, defying instructions, again awarded damages to Erving.
Erving relented only when Cradock was about to take the matter
to the British royal council.3 9
The English responded to their difficulties with American
juries partly by extending the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, a
jurisdiction that before 1767 had been limited to maritime cases.
The Townshend Acts of that year empowered these nonjury
courts to enforce English revenue measures." Parliament also
permitted some English officials charged with crimes to be tried
in England rather than America.4 Moreover, resurrecting a
statute enacted during the reign of Henry VIII (before there were
American colonies or any thought of them), Parliament declared
that colonists charged with treason would be tried in England.4 2
Edmund Burke protested that an English venue would effectively
deprive American defendants of their right to jury trial.
Transporting American defendants across the Atlantic would,
indeed, condemn them unheard: "[B]rought hither in the dungeon
of a ship's hold.., he is vomited into a dungeon on land, loaded
with irons, unfurnished with money, unsupported by friends,
three thousand miles from all means of calling upon or confronting evidence .... "'
In 1776, the Declaration of Independence listed as a grievance against George III his "depriving us... of the benefits of
trial by jury." Fifteen years later, the Sixth Amendment promised
the people of the United States what they already had been
promised by the Constitution of 1787 and by their states-that in
all criminal prosecutions they would enjoy the right to jury
trial."

' This description of Erving v Cradock is drawn from Reid, In a Defiant Stance at 3032.

40 See Carl Ubbelohde, The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American
Revolution 208
(North Carolina, 1960).
41 Richard B. Morris, ed, Encyclopedia ofAmerican History 82 (Harper & Row, rev ed
1965) (describing the Administration of Justice Act of 1774, 14 Geo I, ch 39, § 1, 30 GB
Stat 367, 368).
42 Edmund Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, in 2 The Works of The
Right
HonorableEdmund Burke 189, 192 (Little, Brown, 9th ed 1889).
43

Id at 192-93.

Not only did the constitutions of the original states guarantee jury trial, but the
"constitution of every State entering the Union thereafter... protected the right to jury
trial in criminal cases." Duncan v Louisiana,391 US 145, 153 (1968).
4
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CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE JURY

In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville described the American jury in
terms that the framers would have approved. The jury, he said,
was "a political institution ...one form of the sovereignty of the
people ...."4 Along with universal suffrage (a term used without any sense of irony to describe the enfranchisement of adult
white men), the jury was a "means of making the majority prevail."4 6 Tocqueville called the jury a "free school.., in which
each juror learns his rights," and he wrote that "juries teach men
equity in practice."47
Academic convention divides constitutional provisions into
two types. Some are structural-they allocate governmental power. Others guarantee individual rights. As Akhil Amar has emphasized, the Sixth Amendment fits easily within both categories.' Jury trial was a valued right of persons accused of
crime, and it was also an allocation of political power to the citizenry.
In recent years, scholars have emphasized the elitism of the
framers of the Constitution,4 9 yet the framers established the
most democratic nation-state in the world.50 The jury was an
important part of their experiment in democracy. Thomas Jefferson declared, "Were I called upon to decide whether the people
"' Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 283 (Knopf, 1945).
i6 Id at 287.
47 Id at 285, 284. The observations of another French visitor later in the century were
similar.
The Americans consider and value the jury otherwise than as a judicial institution;
they think that the jury constitutes the best political school in a popular government.
Its operation puts the people in repeated contact with the elite of democratic countries, the lawyers and magistracy. In this instructive business, [the juror] is initiated
into the ideas of law and of justice; he develops respect for the laws and for the feeling of dignity and individual responsibility.
Horace Helbronner, Le Pouvoir JudiciaireAux Etats-Unis: Son Organisationet Ses Attributions 10 (Imprimerie de A. Parent, 1872), translated in Hyman and Tarrant, American
Trial Jury History at 40 (cited in note 3).
' Akbil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1183-85
(1991).
' See, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits ofAmerican
Constitutionalism:The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (Chicago, 1990).
' A few Native American governments may have been more democratic in some
respects, particularly in the extent to which they permitted women to participate in
governmental affairs. See Lewis Henry Morgan, League of the Iroquois (Citadel, 1962);
Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca 28-30 (Vintage, 1972);
Elisabeth Tooker, The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual, in Bruce G.
Trigger, ed, 15 Handbook of North American Indians: Northeast 418, 424-29 (Smithsonian, 1978).
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had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I
would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.""1
The jury of 1791 seems democratic, however, only in the
context of the times. Every state limited jury service to men;
every state except Vermont restricted jury service to property
owners or taxpayers; three states permitted only whites to serve;
and one state, Maryland, disqualified atheists.52
A. Which White Men?
In England, although qualifications for jury service were less
severe than those for sitting in the House of Commons or for
hunting game, property-ownership requirements disqualified at
least three-quarters of the adult male population from becoming
jurors. In America, however, where land was cheaper and
more available, the story was different. Even before the triumph
of universal suffrage, at least half and perhaps three-quarters of
the white adult male population were qualified to vote.' Most,

51 Letter to the Abbd Arnoux, July 19, 1789, in Julian P. Boyd, ed, 15 The Papersof
Thomas Jefferson 282, 283 (Princeton, 1958).
62 This statement rests on our assumption that the states' requirements for jury
service were at least as demanding as their qualifications for voting. We know of some
early state jury-qualification statutes that duplicated voting requirements and of many
others that added further qualifications. We know of none, however, that authorized
people ineligible to vote to serve on juries.
At the time of the founding, every state except Vermont required that voters be
either freeholders or taxpayers. The most liberal of the states (other than Vermont) were
five that apparently allowed all adult male taxpayers to vote. See Eric Foner and John A.
Garraty, eds, The Reader's Companion to American History 1044 (Houghton Mifflin, 1991).
The freeholding requirements of the remaining seven states demanded the ownership of
varying amounts of land. See Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage: From Property to
Democracy, 1760-1860 12-13 (Princeton, 1960).
Three states-South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia-denied the vote to AfricanAmericans. Id at 15. In the eighteenth century, statutes in various American jurisdictions
had declared Jews, Quakers, atheists, and/or Catholics ineligible to vote, but only
Maryland's disqualification of atheists persisted in 1789. This last religious disqualification disappeared in 1826. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History at 165 (cited in note
41). See also Albert Edward McKinley, The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English
Colonies in America 475-76 (Penn, 1905).
See P. J. R. King, "IlliteratePlebeians, Easily Misled: Jury Composition, Experience, and Behavior in Essex, 1735-1815, and Douglas Hay, The Class Composition of the
Palladium of Liberty: Trial Jurors in the Eighteenth Century, both in Cockburn and
Green, eds, Twelve Good Men and True at 254, 261; 305, 349, 357 (cited in note 1).
" See Willi Paul Adams, The FirstAmerican Constitutions:Republican Ideology and
the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 199 (North Carolina, 1980).
Adams's figures accord with material presented in the authoritative study of American
voting qualifications, Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage at 20-39 (cited in note 52).
Another scholar, however, has presented very different figures. McKinley, The Suffrage
Franchiseat 487-88 (cited in note 52).
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though not all, of these voters were probably eligible for jury
service as well.55
The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 left the determination of
juror qualifications in the federal courts to the states, 56 and
state qualifications for jury service frequently matched those for
voting. Many states, however, imposed additional requirements-both general requirements of intelligence, good character,
and the like57 and specific taxpaying and property-holding requirements.5 8
The early nineteenth century saw a rapid movement away
from property qualifications and toward universal suffrage for
white males," yet the liberalization of voting requirements was
not always accompanied by a similar liberalization of requirements for jury service. As this article will explain in greater
detail, the reform of jury qualifications has often lagged behind
the reform of qualifications for voting. In many states,

unpropertied white men, African-Americans, and women did not
serve on juries until considerably after they gained the vote.
In Georgia, a 1797 statute described qualified jurors as people qualified to vote,60 and the adoption of universal suffrage

See note 52.
An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 29, 1 Stat 73, 88
(1789) ("[Jlurors shall have the same qualifications as are requisite for jurors by the laws
of the State of which they are citizens .... ").
"' For example, a Delaware act in 1811 commanded the sheriff to summon "sober,
discreet and judicious freeholders, lawful men and of fair characters, and inhabitants of
his bailiwick, to "serve as petit jurors .... " An Act to Regulate the Summoning and
Returning Juries § 4, 4 Del Laws 444, 447 (1811), codified at Rev Del Laws 118 (1829).
" Illinois entered the union in 1818 with a taxpaying requirement for jurors. See An
Act Prescribing the Mode of Summoning Grand and Petit Jurors, and Defining Their
Qualifications and Duties § 1 (1827), codified at Ill Rev Stat 378-79 (1833). Yet the state
had no taxpaying or property-holding requirement for voters. Kirk H. Porter, A History of
Suffrage in the United States 48-49 (Greenwood, ed, 1969). At the time they joined the
union, Alabama, Kentucky, and Indiana permitted all adult white men to vote. Id at 50,
110. These states nevertheless required jurors to be property holders. See Digest of the
Laws of the State of Alabama § 4 at 296 (Aiken, 1833); Act of Dec 17, 1796, in Digest of
the Statute Laws of Kentucky (Morehead & Brown, 1834); Ind Rev Laws, ch 53 § 1 at 291
(1831).
"' In 1777, Vermont became the first state to establish universal white male suffrage.
Chilton Williamson, Property, Suffrage and Voting in Windham, 25 Vt Hist 135 (1957).
The next state to adopt universal white male suffrage was Kentucky, which entered the
Union without a taxpaying or a property-holding requirement in 1792. During the same
year, New Hampshire abandoned its taxpaying requirement. Mississippi entered the
Union in 1817 with a taxpaying requirement, but universal white male suffrage was the
rule for states admitted to the Union thereafter. Although a few taxpaying requirements
persisted into the twentieth century, North Carolina became the last state to abandon
property qualifications for voting in 1856. Porter, A History of Suffrage at 110.
' An Act to Revise and Amend the Judiciary System § 27 (Feb 9, 1797), Digest of the
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one year later"' therefore established universal white-male eligibility for jury service as well. Connecticut, however, abandoned
its freeholding requirement for voting in 181862 yet continued to
require jurors to be freeholders until 1836.' New York repealed
its property-holding requirement for voting in 1821 and abandoned its taxpaying requirement five years later." The state
nevertheless continued to impose a $250 property-holding requirement for jury service until 1967.6" A federal court upheld
this New York requirement against constitutional challenge in
1949.' Eventually, twentieth-century courts deprived the few
remaining state taxpaying requirements of most of their bite by
holding that these requirements could be satisfied by the payment of a sales tax on any purchase-or even by the payment of
a federal tax.6 7
In 1946, the Supreme Court invoked its supervisory power
over the administration of federal justice and struck down an exclusion of daily wage earners from jury service. The Court refused to "breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish the
jury as the instrument of the economically and socially
privileged."' By 1946, class-based qualifications like those accepted by the framers of the Constitution appeared inconsistent
with the very concept of jury trial.6 9
Especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, formal
qualifications offered no clear indication of who served on juries
in fact. The members of a group eligible for jury service might
never serve, for jurors were not randomly summoned from among
those eligible. Instead, public officials called selectmen, supervisors, trustees, or "sheriffs of the parish" exercised what
Laws of the State of Georgia 271, 278 (Marbury and Crawford, 1802).
s* Porter, A History of Suffrage at 110.
6

Id.

An Act of June 2, 1836, 1836 Conn Pub Acts 5, ch 6.
Porter, A History of Suffrage at 110.
See An Act to Amend the Judiciary Law, in Relation to Qualifications of Jurors § 1,
1967 NY Laws 68, ch 49.
6
United States v Foster,83 F Supp 197, 208 (S D NY 1949). See Gibson v Mississippi, 162 US 565, 580 (1896) (upholding Mississippi's property-holding requirement). Later
judicial rulings declared property-holding requirements like New York's unconstitutional.
See Clark u Ellenbogen, 319 F Supp 623, 626 (W D Pa 1970), aff'd, 402 US 935 (1971);
Leggroan v Smith, 498 F2d 168, 171 (10th Cir 1974).
See Clark, 319 F Supp at 627.
Thiel v Southern PacificCo., 328 US 217, 223-24 (1946).
Without reaching the issue, the Thiel opinion intimated that all class-based exclusions from jury service were unconstitutional. Id. But see People v Cerrone, 867 P2d 143,
147 (Colo App 1993) (permitting the exclusion of hourly wage earners from service on a

state-wide grand jury).
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Tocqueville called "very extensive and very arbitrary" powers in
summoning jurors."
Just as formal eligibility for jury service did not always
mean eligibility in fact, statutory disqualification did not always
mean real disqualification. When qualified jurors failed to appear, statutes permitted court clerks or sheriffs to impanel
unqualified "bystanders." In a number of jurisdictions, the nonappearance of qualified jurors and the use of bystanders was com71
mon.
In cases in which aliens were parties, American courts occasionally impanelled juries de medietate linguae, juries composed
half of Americans and half of countrymen of the alien party.72
English law authorized this procedure, which had been devised
initially to protect the interests of Jewish moneylenders and
foreign merchants, for seven hundred years, from at least the end
of the twelfth century until 1870."3 In America, Chief Justice
Marshall once employed it to select jurors in the case of an alien
charged with piracy and murder.74 Indeed, as recently as 1911,
a French citizen accused of murder in Louisville, Kentucky, asserted his right to a jury de medietate linguae. The Kentucky Supreme Court discovered to its surprise that this sort of jury was
still expressly authorized by statute and concluded that a Kentucky trial judge had authority to impanel one.7"
Throughout the nineteenth century, objections that the jury
was elitist were far less frequent than claims that jurors were
unqualified. As early as 1803,. St. George Tucker's influential

7oTocqueville, 2 Democracy in America at 359-60 (cited in note 45).
71 See, for example, David J. Bodenhamer, The Pursuit of Justice: Crime and Law in
Antebellum Indiana 83-88 (Garland, 1986); Douglas Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforce.
ment in the Colony of New York, 1691-1776 172-73 (Cornell, 1974).
" See Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of"de medietate
linguae" (unpublished 1994) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Constable, The Law of the Other
(cited in note 1).
" The first statutory recognition of the jury de medietate linguae came in 1353, but
the procedure had been used in various local courts long before. The right to it was confirmed by various charters. See Constable, The Law of the Other at 4-5, 18, 96-97, 145.
7' See United States v Cartacho, 25 F Cases 312, 312-13 (D Va 1823). See also
Respublica v Mesca, 1 US 73, 75 (Pa 1783) (granting a jury de medietate linguae);People v
MLean, 2 Johnson 380, 380-81 (NY 1807) (same). But see State v Antonio, 11 NC 200, 206
(1825) (refusing to grant); Richards v Commonwealth, 38 Va 723, 731 (1841) (same).
Compare Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich L Rev 1611,
1695-1708 (1985) (arguing that an African-American, Native American, or Hispanic
defendant should have a right to the inclusi~n of"racially similar" jurors).
7' Wendling v Commonwealth, 143 Ky 587, 593, 137 SW 205, 208 (1911). The statute
was permissive, however, and the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying the
defendant's request. 137 SW at 206.
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American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries reported that,
"after the first day or two," juries hearing civil lawsuits in the
rural areas of Virginia were "made up, generally, of idle loiterers
about the court,... the most unfit persons to decide upon the
controversies of suitors."" In criminal cases, jurors were summoned by deputy sheriffs whose lack of qualifications frequently
"invite[d] the attempt.., to corrupt them."77
Tucker reported a murder case in 1800 in which the judge
halted the proceedings after discovering that a deputy sheriff had
summoned jurors from a list of twenty-four prospects submitted
by the defendant's father. In another case, eleven or twelve people who were in a courtroom awaiting trial on a charge of riot
comprised most of the jury panel for the trial of another defendant charged with horse-stealing. The waiting defendants thus
secured payment for some of their time in court. 8
Tucker concluded that jurors frequently took bribes. Noting a
"multiplicity" of "acquittals against positive evidence," particularly in homicide and malicious mayhem cases, he offered two
alternate explanations: there was either "an infinite degree of
pejury" on the part of witnesses or an "unpardonable disregard"
of duty by jurors. 9
In Kentucky in 1858, a critic described jurors as "miserable
wretches."' A Georgia newspaper called them "vagabonds.""
An observer in antebellum Indiana described jurors as "idle and
dissolute persons" and as "[1]oafers and drunkards."82 Touring
the West after the Civil War, Mark Twain facetiously noted a
case in which:
[w]hen the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury
of twelve men was impaneled-a jury who swore they had
neither heard, read, talked about nor expressed an opinion
concerning a murder which the very cattle in the corrals ... were cognizant of!

...

It actually came out after-

William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries App 64 (St. George Tucker, ed) (Birch and
W'
Small, 1803). We are grateful to Linda K. Kerber for this reference.
7 Id at 66.
'6 Id at 66 n*.

79 Id at 66-67.
' See Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the Nine.
teenth-CenturyAmerican South 113 (Oxford, 1984).

Id.
I1
Bodenhamer, The Pursuitof Justice at 84 (cited in note 71). Despite this criticism,
the Indiana legislature, hoping to reduce judicial expenses, made the use of bystander
jurors easier. Id at 83-85.
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ward, that one of [the jurors] thought that incest and arson
were the same thing."
Twain is said to have observed, "We have a jury system that is
superior to any in the world, and its efficiency is only marred by
the difficulty of finding twelve men everyday who don't know
anything and can't read. '
These witticisms and criticisms probably had some grounding. The names of over one-third of the people who served as
jurors in Whitfield County, Georgia, in 1853 did not appear on
county tax rolls or census lists. Moreover, the wealth of the jurors who were listed on the tax rolls was below the county's average.85 In sixty percent of the criminal trials held in antebellum
Marion County, Indiana, bystanders comprised a majority of all
jurors."
B. African-Americans
White men without much property, knowledge, or distinction
thus made their way onto American juries. The path to equality

Mark Twain, Roughing It 342-43 (American, 1872). John T. Morse, Jr., described a
case in which "[alt last, after a long period and careful search, a dozen men were brought
together, presumably the most unintelligent creatures in California, so exceptionably imbecile as to be unexceptionable." Quoted in Hubert Howe Bancroft, 38 The Works of
Hubert Howe Bancroft 301 (History, 1890). In 1885, S. Stewart Whitehouse complained:
[Bletter qualified classes of citizens do not serve as jurymen. By some peculiar way
they fail to be drawn .... or if perchance drawn, manage to get excused. All lawyers
know this to be a fact .... As a result there is generally left for this important public service but a residuum of stupid and incompetent species of the genus homo.
It were as reasonable and proper in time of war to excuse our able-bodied men
and draft none but cripples and puny-bodied unfortunates ....
S. Stewart Whitehouse, Trial By Jury, As It Is and As It Should Be, 31 Albany L J 504,
505-06 (1885).
' Quoted in Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 154 (1989).
Following the publication of this article, which reported the author's belief in the accuracy
of the quotation despite his inability to locate it, a generous reader wrote him and supplied a citation, which Mr. Alschuler has lost. The frequent disparagement of jurors in
nineteenth-century America continued a tradition that had begun long before in England.
See id at 154 n 3; Langbein, 50 U Chi L Rev at 120 (cited in note 1); King, "IlliteratePle.
beians, Easily Misled" at 256-58 (cited in note 53).
Ayers, Vengeance and Justice at 113 (cited in note 80).
Bodenhamer, Pursuitof Justice at 86 (cited in note 71). Most of these bystanders
met Indiana property-holding requirements, but many did not. On the average, the
property holdings of bystanders were less than those of regular jurors by almost four
thousand dollars. Id at 87.
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in the jury box was vastly more arduous for African-Americans
and for women."7 For them, the journey is still not complete.

' The story of the progress of members of other racial and ethnic groups toward a
place in the jury box is even sketchier than that of African-Americans. Nevertheless,
because a denial of federal citizenship automatically precludes federal jury service, the
development of the law of citizenship tells part of the story.
A historical description of national citizenship must focus separately on citizenship
conferred by naturalization and that conferred by birth. The Naturalization Act of 1790
declared only "free white person[s]" eligible for naturalization. 1 Stat 103, ch 3, § 1. In
1827, Chancellor Kent noted that this Act apparently precluded the naturalization not
only of "the inhabitants of Africa, and their descendant" but also of 'the copper-colored
natives of America" and "the yellow or tawny races of the Asiatics." James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 38-39 (Little, Brown, 10th ed 1860).
During the early years of the republic, the federal citizenship of persons born within
the United States remained cloudy, in large part because the relationship between the
states and the federal government was uncertain. See generally James H. Kettner, The
Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 213-32 (North Carolina, 1978). In Dred
Scott v Sandford, 60 US 393 (1857), the Supreme Court declared that national citizenship
was limited to whites who had been citizens of the original thirteen states in 1789, people
who had been naturalized by Congress, and the descendants of both. Id at 406, 419.
The principle of "whites only" was invoked by courts to imply exclusions from political rights that legislatures had not enacted. In 1854, the California Supreme Court noted
that a statute prohibited a "Black or Mulatto person, or Indian" from testifying in a case
in which a white person was a party. People v Hall, 4 Cal 399, 399 (1854). Although the
statute did not mention Asians, the court held that it precluded Chinese people from
testifying as well. "The same rule which would admit [the Chinese] to testify, would admit
them to all the equal rights of citizenship, and we might soon see them at the polls, in the
jury box, upon the bench, and in our legislative halls." Id at 404.
Following the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment extended United States citizenship to "[aill persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." Nevertheless, when the Naturalization Act was amended in 1870 to include
people from Africa, Congressmen from western states ensured that it did not permit the
naturalization of people from Asia. See Moritoshi Fukuda, Legal Problems of JapaneseAmericans: Their History and Development in the United States 6-8, 10 (Keio Tsushin,
1980) (retaining the word "white," the statute also permitted the naturalization of "persons of African nativity and descent). A series of state and federal decisions after 1870
construed the Act's reference to "white person[s]" to prevent the naturalization of people
from China, Japan, Burma, Hawaii, and India. Id at 13-14.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, people of oriental ancestry born in the United
States were unquestionably citizens, but in 1872, Senator Henry Corbett opposed legislation to forbid racial discrimination in jury selection-legislation that Congress ultimately
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Corbett objected that under the proposal:

[The State cannot exclude a Chinaman from the jury-box. It is a question now to be
determined by the Senate of the United States whether they are willing to fill our
jury-boxes with a people who are not accountable in any way to the Christian religion as recognized in this country. I believe that the only thing they recognize as an
oath binding upon them is this: that you shall cut off the head of a chicken, and the
Chinaman swears in the presence of that, or by that, that he will judge of the matter
according to that oath.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that we are extending this privilege a little too
far. I think we are not prepared to allow our jury-boxes to be packed by twelve
Chinamen, who can be bought and sold. If they were allowed in the jury-box, the
man who imports them into this country by contract could sell them, and make them
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Only three of the original thirteen states formally denied the
vote to African-Americans,m and for a time free blacks did vote
in noticeable numbers in both the North and the South.8 9 By
1830, however, many states had disenfranchised blacks by law,
and there was "no extensive Negro voting anywhere."90 Indeed,
by the time of the Civil War, only six states permitted AfricanAmericans to vote.9 ' One of these states, New York, had distinctive 92residency and property requirements for African-Americans.
Perhaps, just as African-Americans sometimes voted, a few
African-Americans served on juries in the early years of the Republic. So far as we are aware, however, the first African-Americans ever to serve on a jury in America were two who sat in
Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1860. Their service was described
as "the first of such instances" in the state's history,9 3 and it was

do just as he should instruct them. You can go into any community where they reside, as I am credibly informed by intelligent lawyers who have had experience, and
buy a Chinaman to testify just as you desire ....
Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 2d Sess at 898 (Feb 8, 1872).
Even after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that
Native Americans who retained their tribal membership were not citizens of the United
States. Elk v Wilkins, 112 US 94, 109 (1884). These "unassimilated" Indians were excluded from federal juries until Congress declared them citizens in 1924. An Act to Authorize
the Secretary of the Interior to Issue Certificates of Citizenship to Indians, 43 Stat 253, ch
233 (June 2, 1924), eventually codified at 8 USC 1401(b) (1988).
Of course the path to citizenship marked only part of the journey to the jury box. In
some places, Mexican-Americans, although not disqualified from jury service, were excluded through the "key man" system and other discriminatory devices. See Hernandez v Texas, 347 US 475, 476 n 1, 480-81 (1954); Castanedav Partida,430 US 482, 484-88 (1977).
For a description of the "key man" system in which court clerks and jury commissioners
invited prominent civic and political leaders to nominate prospective jurors, see Jon M.
Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures:Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 86 (Ballinger, 1977).
' See note 52. With the exception of Tennessee, however, every Southern state that
entered the Union after 1789 formally disqualified African-Americans from voting. John
Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom:A History of the American Negroes 217 (Knopf,
1947).
' See id (noting that blacks voted "to a considerable extent" in Maryland, New York,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania "for several years"); Roger Wallace Shugg, Negro
Voting in the Ante-Bellum South, 21 J Negro Hist 357, 357-64 (1936) (North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Louisiana).
Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom at 218.
91 The states were Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. See Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 156 (1970) (Harlan concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
92 Id.
' See Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 94
(Chicago, 1961). Litwack concluded that no Northern state had impaneled an AfricanAmerican juror before these two jurors served in 1860. Even when the statutes of North-
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sufficiently unusual to provoke comment elsewhere. An Indiana
Congressman declared with astonishment that Massachusetts:
would allow a white man to be accused of crime by a negro;
to be arrested on the affidavit of a negro, by a negro officer;
to be prosecuted by a negro lawyer; testified against by a
negro witness; tried before a negro judge; convicted before a
negro jury; and executed by a negro executioner; and either
one of these negroes might become the husband of his widow
or his daughter!'
In 1864, Congress enacted legislation permitting AfricanAmericans to testify in federal courts,95 and at the end of the
Civil War, it enacted legislation declaring the right of AfricanAmericans to testify in state cases as well. 6 Opponents of these
measures objected that permitting African-Americans to testify
against whites would lead inevitably to the inclusion of AfricanAmericans on juries. Proponents, however, disavowed this objective. Noting that women and children served as witnesses
although they were ineligible for jury service, these legislators
denied any connection between appearing as a witness and serving as a juror.9 7
After the War, African-American leaders in the South
stressed the importance of integrating juries. At a political convention in North Carolina, the Reverend James W. Hood declared
that the Negro deserved:

ern states did not prevent African-Americans from serving, custom and prejudice did. Id.
94 Id at 96-97.
' See An Act Making Appropriations for Civil Expenses of the Government § 3, 13
Stat 351, ch 210 (1864).
w Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, 14 Stat 27, ch 31. Prior to the Civil War, statutes in
many jurisdictions had precluded African-Americans from testifying if a party to the case
was white. See James Forman, Jr., History and the Right to Jury Trial:FromAbolition to
Reconstruction 46 n 121 (unpublished paper, Yale Law School, 1992) (on file with U Chi L
Rev). The Ohio Supreme Court declared in 1846:
No matter how pure the character, yet, if the color is not right, the man can not testify. The truth shall not be received from a black man, to settle a controversy where
a white man is a party. Let a man be Christian or infidel; let him be Turk, Jew, or
Mahometan; let him be of good character or bad; even let him be sunk to the lowest
depths of degradation; he may be a witness in our courts if he is not black.
Jordan v Smith, 14 Ohio 199, 201 (1846), quoted in Forman, History and the Right to
Jury Trial at 46 n 21.
' Cong Globe, 38th Cong, 1st Sess 40 (Feb 26, 1864) (statement of Senator Harlan);
Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess 941 (Mar 8, 1866) (Statement of Representative Wilson).
See Forman, History and the Right to Jury Trial at 46-48.
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First, the right to testify in courts of justice, in order that we
may defend our property and our rights. Secondly, representation in the jury box. It is the right of every man accused of any offence, to be tried by a jury of his peers ....
Thirdly and finally, the black man should have the right to
carry his ballot to the ballot box. These are the rights that
we want-that we will contend for-and that, by the help of
God, we will have .... 9
During Reconstruction, African-Americans in some jurisdictions regularly served on juries. In 1867, the military commander
of South Carolina declared every taxpayer or registered voter to
be eligible for jury service. Since the military itself had registered
virtually every adult African-American male, integrated juries
became common in this district.99 Two years later, the South
Carolina legislature mandated not only that grand and petit
juries be integrated but also that their racial composition duplicate the composition of the counties in which they sat.'0 0 As one
observer described:
The sensation is peculiar.. to see a Court in session,
where former slaves sit side by side with their old owners on
the jury, where white men are tried by a mixed jury, where
colored lawyers plead, and where white and colored officers
maintain order.'0 '
Almost one-third of the citizens called for grand jury service in
New Orleans between 1872 and 1878 were African-Americans-a
percentage that matched the percentage of African-Americans in
02
the population of Orleans Parish generally.

98 Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery 505 (Vintage Books, 1980) (emphasis omitted).
" Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South CarolinaDuring Reconstruction, 1861-1877 329 (North Carolina, 1965).

0 Id at 334.

Id at 329-30, citing NY Times 5 (June 14, 1869). A federal judge, Alexander Rives,
noted in 1878 that he had "always ordered mixed juries" and had "not discovered that
harm has resulted from it...."
Charles Fairman, 7 History of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88 pt 2, 442 (Macmillan, 1987), quoting
a statement reported in The Richmond Dispatch (Dec 12, 1878).
" Drew L. Kershen, The Jury Selection Act of 1879: Theory and Practice of Citizen
Participationin the JudicialSystem, 1980 U Ill L F 707, 756.
101
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Some Southern jurisdictions, however, kept African-Americans from jury service even during Reconstruction. °3 In 1876, a
newspaper for African-Americans in Savannah observed:
There is not a single instance on record where a colored
juror has served upon any jury in this city or county. We
have been told for eight years past, the names of colored
men have been in the jury box, and these boxes have been
e
1 °
exhausted timedrawn.
and again,
and not one colored man's name
has ever been
The years following the Civil War saw four notable legal
developments that affected the criminal jury. In 1868, the
Fourteenth Amendment declared that no state could enact or
enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States. The amendment also forbade any state to
deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. Two years
later, the Fifteenth Amendment declared that "the right to vote
shall not be abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided that "no citizen.., shall be disqualified for service as a grand or petit juror
in any court of the United States, or of any State on account of
race." 105 And four years later, the Federal Jury Selection Act of
1879 reversed the course of earlier congressional action, facilitated discriminatory jury selection in the federal courts, and
brought Reconstruction in the jury box to an end.0 6
Although the Supreme Court has concluded that racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of those excluded from jury service,0 7 this reading of the
amendment probably does not reflect the "original understanding." Neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Privileges and
Immunities Clause was understood at the time of its enactment
to extend political rights (like the right to vote and the right to
serve on juries) to African-Americans. 108
13 See Edmund L. Drago, Black Politiciansand Reconstruction in Georgia:A Splendid
Failure 40-41, 96-97 (Louisiana State, 1982).
' Colored Tribune (June 3, 1876), quoted in Forman, History and the Right to Jury
Trial at 93 (cited in note 96) (emphasis omitted).
'0 18 Stat 335, 336, ch 114, § 4, codified at 18 USC § 243 (1988).
1
21 Stat 43, ch 52, § 2 (1879).
"
Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 407-08 (1991).
106 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
Years, 1789.1888 384 & n 118 (Chicago, 1985); Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 152 (1970)
(Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Evidence of this fact appeared in the Fourteenth Amendment
itself. Section 2 provided that if a state denied the vote to any
adult male, excluding Indians not taxed, those excluded would
not be counted as part of the state's population in allocating
representation in Congress. This provision gave a minor spur to
the enfranchisement of African-Americans while confirming that
authority to resolve the issue remained with the states. Even
more clearly, the enactment of a subsequent amendment to afford African-Americans the vote revealed an understanding that
the Fourteenth Amendment itself had not done so." 9
Separate drafts of the Fifteenth Amendment passed by the
House and the Senate extended not only the right to vote but
also the right to hold office to African-Americans. When the
amendment emerged from a conference committee, however, the
office-holding provisions were gone. Senator Edmunds suggested
that although Republican incumbents were willing to afford African-Americans the opportunity to vote Republican, they were
unenthusiastic about the prospect that African-American candidates might run against them."' The Fifteenth Amendment extended the vote to African-Americans but did not confer other
political rights upon them-including the right to serve on juries."'

" See Mitchell, 400 US at 152 (Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reviewing other evidence as well). To the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal
protection of the laws apparently did not mean what many assume that it means today--equal treatment by the government in every respect. It meant equal legal protection
from civil wrongs.
If this reading of the clause seems odd, consider the status of women and aliens.
Only ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 afforded women the vote, and it
seems unlikely that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant this Amendment to
do for women what the Nineteenth Amendment did a half-century later. See Minor v
Happersett, 88 US 162, 170-71 (1874) (holding that although women could be citizens,
their citizenship did not entitle them to vote). Aliens-also "persons" within the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause-cannot vote or serve on juries today.
Congress apparently hesitated to enfranchise African-Americans at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment because many Northern states were unwilling to do so. Republicans, however, confident that African-American voters would support their party, secured
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment two years later. Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L.
Karst, and Dennis Mahoney, eds, 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 725-26
(Macmillan, 1986).
11 Cong Globe, 40th Cong, 3d Sess 1626 (Feb 26, 1869). See Earl M. Maltz, Civil
Rights, the Constitution,and Congress, 1863-1869 154 (Kansas, 1990).
.. Some supporters of the Fifteenth Amendment argued, however, that the Amendment conferred the right to hold public office by implication. These supporters maintained
that the "right to elect to office carries with it the inalienable and indissoluble and indefeasible right to be elected." See Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the
Constitution 57 (Lexington Books, 1978) (quoting Representative Butler). See also Amar,
100 Yale L J at 1203 n 313 (cited in note 48).
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Beginning in 1871, immediately following the ratification of
the Fifteenth Amendment, Senator Charles Sumner and other
Republicans sought federal legislation prohibiting state discrimination in jury selection as well as in other official state actions." These Republican legislators did not dispute the general understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment extended

only "civil" rights and not "political" or "social" rights to AfricanAmericans. They nevertheless claimed that the Fourteenth
Amendment provided authority for legislation requiring the inte-

gration of state juries. In their view, discrimination in jury selection did not violate the right of African-Americans to serve on
juries but did violate the right of African-American litigants to
the equal protection of the laws. They contended that the procedural rights of criminal defendants and other litigants were
"civil," not "political," so that these rights were protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."' Sumner and the others who took
this view recognized that whites and blacks were not equally free
of bias toward black litigants. These legislators were not colorblind, and they foresaw that all-white juries would be instruments of racial oppression. Senator Edmunds declared:
Where would be the value of declaring that a colored man
should have equal rights of trial by jury and equal rights of
judgment by his peers, if you are to say that the jurors are

' See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the DesegregationDecisions (unpublished paper on file with U Chi L Rev). Congress had authorized African-Americans to
serve on juries in the District of Columbia in 1869. See An Act for the Further Security of
Equal Rights in the District of Columbia, 16 Stat 3, ch 3 (Mar 18, 1869).
1
See, for example, Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 2d Sess 845 (Feb 6, 1872) (statement of
Senator John Sherman):

It does seem to me, not that it is the right of a man to serve on a jury, but that it is
the right of all men to have a fair law and rule by which men of their own race,and
color may serve on a jury. It is the right of the accused and not the right of the trier ....

The opponents of racial discrimination in jury selection occasionally advanced a
claim that focused on the rights of the excluded jurors themselves. They declared that,
unlike the right to vote or to hold office, the right to serve on juries was not a political
right. Jurors in England once had been witnesses summoned to report on developments in
their communities. The right to jury service might therefore be characterized as a civil
right analogous to the right to testify. See 2 Cong Rec 948, 43d Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 27,
1874) (remarks of Senator Sumner); 3 Cong Rec 1866, 43d Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 27, 1875)
(remarks of Senator Edmund). Almost a decade before it outlawed racial discrimination in
state jury selection, Congress had prohibited state courts from refusing the testimony of
African-Americans. See the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat 27, ch 31.
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to be composed of the Ku Klux Klan... ? You are to put
him into the hands of his enemies for trial."4
The likelihood that white jurors would discriminate against
African-American defendants and other African-American litigants was crucial to the argument that mandating the integration of state-court juries would be constitutional. Yet Republicans
were also concerned that all-white juries would refuse to convict
white defendants who committed crimes against African-Americans and white Republicans." 5 An epidemic of violence against
these groups had prompted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. This
act required every juror hearing a prosecution under the act to
swear that he had "never, directly or indirectly, counselled, advised, or voluntarily aided" a conspiracy of the sort that the act
proscribed." 6 Senator Sherman, a supporter of the act, after reciting a series of atrocities in the South, complained that "from
the beginning to the end in all this extent of territory no man has
ever been convicted or punished for any of these offenses, not
one."" 7 Sherman offered as supporting evidence the statements
of several Southern judges. One, for example, said:
In nine cases out of ten the men who commit the crimes
constitute or sit on the grand jury, either they themselves or
their near relatives or friends, sympathizers, aiders, or abettors; and if a bill is found it is next to impossible to secure a
conviction upon a trial at the bar. I have heard of no instance in North Carolina where a conviction of that sort has
taken place."'
The complaints of federal authorities concerning Southern
jury nullification following the Civil War resembled the complaints of Southern authorities concerning Northern jury
nullification before the War"' and the complaints of English
114 Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 2d Sess 900 (Feb 8, 1872).

...See Forman, History and the Right to Jury Trial at 28-46 (cited in note 96). The
material in this and the following paragraph is derived mostly from Forman's paper.
116 17 Stat 13, 15, ch 22, § 5 (1871). The membership oath of the Ku Klux Klan
reputedly required members to obtain places on juries and to vote in favor of fellow
members no matter what the evidence. See Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 158 (Mar 18,
1871) (statement of Senator Sherman).
11 Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 1st Sess 157-58 (Mar 18, 1871).
1
Id at 158, quoting Judge Russel.
i
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 1 Stat 302, provided for the return of an escaped
slave upon proof of title before a magistrate, but some Northern states passed personal
liberty laws giving alleged runaways the right to trial by jury. See Thomas D. Morris,
Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North, 1780-1861 73 (Johns Hopkins,
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authorities concerning jury nullification in the colonial period." Southern juries, however, appeared to be nullifying laws
against personal violence rather than laws requiring cooperation
in returning escaped slaves or paying duties imposed by an unrepresentative government." As an African-American commentator said of a later period, the problem was "not so much that
the negro fails to get justice before the Courts" as that "too often... the... white man... escapes it."2

1974). Henry B. Stanton told the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1839, "Give the panting fugitive this inestimable right in every northern State, and he is safe ... ." Id. The
Supreme Court held the Pennsylvania personal liberty law unconstitutional, however, in
Priggv Pennsylvania, 41 US 536, 624-25 (1842).
After Prigg, some states provided remedies to alleged fugitive slaves through the
writ of habeas corpus and the writ de homine replegiando (a complex procedure that
allowed access to a jury). See Morris, Free Men All at 10-12, 76-79, 169-70. This practice
ended when the Supreme Court held that state courts lacked the power to interfere with
federal orders enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act. Ableman v Booth, 62 US 506, 523-26
(1859). See also Morris, FreeMen All at 145-46, 178-80.
Anti-slavery forces sought unsuccessfully to include a right to jury trial in the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 9 Stat 462. One senator opposed to providing jury trials argued
that, even apart from the likelihood that Northern jurors would refuse to return runaway
slaves, the delay and expense of jury proceedings would make it nearly impossible for
slave owners to recover their property. Cong Globe, 31st Cong, 1st Sess, App 1584 (Aug
19, 1850) (statement of Senator Mason).
Especially in the years following 1850, abolitionists denounced Congress's failure to
authorize jury trials in fugitive-slave proceedings. They observed that although the Constitution required the return of fugitive slaves, it said nothing about the use of juries to
determine the status of people alleged to be fugitives. These abolitionists decried the
hypocrisy of using juries to determine the ownership of cows, oxen, and acres of land but
not the ownership of human beings. They argued that when the right to jury trial extended to every twenty-dollar lawsuit for civil damages, depriving a person of liberty without
affording her the right to a hearing before a jury was unconscionable. See Forman, History and the Right to Jury Trial at 6-10, 16-24 (cited in note 96).
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, part of the Compromise of 1850, not only authorized
fugitive-slave proceedings before a magistrate, 9 Stat 462, ch 60, § 4, but also permitted
the agents of slaveholders to seize fugitives without judicial oversight. Id at 463, ch 60, §
6. Abolitionists sometimes responded by rescuing recaptured runaways. In some jurisdictions, it proved impossible for prosecutors to secure convictions of the rescuers from juries
sympathetic to the anti-slavery cause. Leonard W. Levy, Judgments: Essays on American
ConstitutionalHistory 312 n 48 (Quadrangle Books, 1972). See also Morris, Free Men All
at 148-58; Robert M. Cover, JusticeAccused: Antislavery and the JudicialProcess 175-225
(Yale, 1975).
See text accompanying notes 35-44.
1
Discussing whether jury nullification is justified,' Herbert Wechsler once said,
"What's sauce for the goose depends on whose ox is being gored." Quoted by H. Richard
Uviller in Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 145 FRD 149, 180 (1992).
1
William H. Thomas, "The Negro and Crime" 7 (speech at the Southern Sociological
Congress, Nashville, May 7-10, 1912), quoted in Ayers, Vengeance and Justice at 179
(cited in note 80) (emphasis omitted). See generally William C. Heffernan, Comments: The
MajoritarianThreat Posed by the Jury, 25 Crim L Bull 79 (1989).
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As Michael McConnell has observed, the claim that Congress
could forbid state jury discrimination generated "serious qualms
among constitutionally scrupulous members [of Congress] generally sympathetic to the civil rights cause. " ' Senator Matthew
Carpenter, for example, favored federal legislation outlawing
racially segregated public schools but opposed legislation forbidding discriminatory jury selection. In Carpenter's view, the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to desegregate the
schools but not to end discrimination in the jury box.'
After five years of legislative wrangling, compromise, and
defeat, Senator Sumner's position prevailed. The Civil Rights Act
of 1875 forbade disqualification from jury service on the basis of
race and made it a crime for any state or federal official to discriminate on racial grounds in selecting jurors.2
Two years earlier, a West Virginia statute had disqualified
African-Americans from jury service.' In enacting this statute,
the state legislature had not flouted federal requirements; to the
contrary, its discriminatory legislation seemed likely to be upheld. 7 In 1880, however, the Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional in Strauder v West Virginia."s Endorsing the

claim of Senators Sumner and Sherman and other legislators, the
Court concluded that the statute violated, not the right of Afri-

Southern juries' toleration of violence against African-Americans has not been the
only evidence suggesting that the framers may have been mistaken in envisioning jurors
as the natural defenders of individual liberties. What the framers saw as the jurors' civil
libertarianism was also the self-interested majority sentiment of colonists opposed to a
particular undemocratic government. Perhaps this conjunction was aberrational; in later
years, when civil libertarianism and majority sentiment were less closely linked, individual rights may have been less valued in the jury box. Jurors may in fact be less likely than
legal professionals to protect community pariahs, be they freedmen, carpetbaggers, landlords, the phone company, fat people, abusive spouses, escaped convicts, immigrants, gays
and lesbians, or Rodney King.
's
McConnell, Originalismat 75 (cited in note 112).
4 Id at 75 n 279. Carpenter asked, "Can we fix the qualifications for serving as a
juror in a State court any more than we can fix the qualification for serving upon the
bench of a State court?" Cong Globe, 42d Cong, 2d Sess 760 (Feb 1, 1872).
18 Stat 335, 336, ch 114, §4 (1875), originally codified at 8 USC § 44 (1925), currently codified at 18 USC § 243 (1988).
1872-73 W Va Acts 102, ch 47, § 1 (1873).
12 See Alfred Avins, The Fourteenth Amendment and Jury Discrimination: The
OriginalUnderstanding,in Civil Rights: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong, 2d Sess 615, 641
(1966) (rejecting the Supreme Court's conclusion in Ex parte Virginia, 100 US 339 (1880),
and arguing that "federal laws banning jury discrimination in state courts are in excess of
Congress' constitutional power to enact").
"m 100 US 303 (1880).
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can-Americans to serve on juries, but the right of African-American defendants to equal protection of the laws. 9
The defendant in Strauder had been indicted and tried for
the murder of his wife during the two years between enactment
of the West Virginia statute and the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875. His trial by an all-white jury therefore did not violate the federal statute. In a companion case to Strauder, however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress's 1875
prohibition of racial discrimination in jury selection. 3 '
By the time of the Strauderdecision, the temper of Congress
had changed, and Reconstruction was almost at an end. During
the Civil War, Congress had enacted measures requiring federal
jurors to swear their past and future loyalty to the United States
and disqualifying most men who fought for the Confederacy from
federal jury service.'' Congressional Democrats resented this
exclusion, and they also resented the perceived "packing" of jury
boxes by Republican officials." 2 A Congressman from Ohio complained that the people selected as jurors in his state were usually "ignorant and prejudiced colored men." A Senator from Alabama claimed that federal marshals appointed only AfricanAmericans and Northern whites. An Alabama Representative
maintained that federal jurors were frequently Republican government employees. And a Senator from Tennessee protested
that federal marshals exacted promises from jurors to decide in
favor of the government.' 3
Complaints of this sort led to the Federal Jury Selection Act
of 1879.' The federal courts previously had borrowed juryselection procedures from the courts of the states in which they
sat.'3 5 In place of these procedures, the 1879 Act authorized federal courts to employ either of two different mechanisms for
selecting venires. Both mechanisms seemed likely to nullify in

129

Id at 308-10.

'30
131

Exparte Virginia, 100 US 339, 344-49 (1880).
An Act Defining Additional Causes of Challenge for Grand and Petit Jurors, 12

Stat 430, ch 103, §§ 1-2 (June 17, 1862). Section 1 of the Act (Confederate service
disqualification) was repealed by the Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 17 Stat 13, 15, ch 22, § 5 (Apr 20, 1871). When Congress codified all federal
statutes in the Revised Statutes of 1874, however, it included § 1, apparently by mistake.
There was great confusion about whether § 1 was still in force. See Kershen, 1980 U Ill L
F at 712-15 (cited in note 102).
1
See Kershen, 1980 U Ill L F at 717-21.
133 Id at 733, citing 9 Cong Rec 783, 2035-36, 1901, and 1791 (1879).
13 21 Stat 43, ch 52, § 2 (1879).
135 See text accompanying notes 56-58.
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practice what the act reaffirmed in theory-that no citizen could
be disqualified from jury service on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
Rather than permit federal officials to use state procedures
to select potential jurors, the Act first permitted these officials to
draw prospective jurors from the pools actually used by the state
courts. Alternatively, the Act authorized the selection of federal
jury pools by two officials, each of whom would supply half the
names. One of these officials would be the clerk of the federal
court; the other, a judicially appointed commissioner who "shall
be... a well-known member of the principal political par"
ty ... opposing that to which the clerk may belong ....
Federal courts continued to select potential jurors through these
mechanisms until the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968 declared that federal jury panels must be "selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community... ."
In Strauder and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Supreme
Court and Congress had effectively (if indirectly) recognized the
right of African-Americans to serve on juries. Yet the right remained unenforced for most of a century.'38 Booker T. Washington observed at the end of the nineteenth century, "In the whole
of Georgia & Alabama, and other Southern states not a negro
juror is allowed to sit in the jury box in state courts."'3 9 A 1910
study found that African-Americans rarely served on juries in
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and
Virginia-and that they never served in Alabama and Geor-

'
21 Stat 43, ch 52, § 2.
131 Pub L No 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat 53, 54, codified at 28 USC § 1861 (1988). The 1968

Act also provided that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded... on account of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or economic status." Pub L No 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat 54, codified at
28 USC § 1862 (1988).
' See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries,Jurisdiction,and Race Discrimination:The Lost
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 Tex L Rev 1401, 1414, 1432-33 (1983). The
exclusion of African-Americans from Southern juries may have been partly responsible for

the increased number of African-Americans incarcerated in this region. In five Southern
states in 1865, only 150 blacks and 150 whites were imprisoned. Thirty years later, the
number of white prisoners remained the same, but the number of African-American prisoners had grown to 1500. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice at 180 (cited in note 80) (graph).
Some Republicans complained that "the courts of law are employed to reenslave the
colored race." Eric Foner, Reconstruction:America's UnfinishedRevolution, 1863-1877 594
(Harper and Row, 1988).
1" Quoted in Schmidt, 61 Tex L Rev at 1406.
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gia. 4 ° Of the period from the end of Reconstruction to the New
Deal, Benno Schmidt has written:
[Tihe systematic exclusion of black men from Southern juries was about as plain as any legal discrimination could be
I by state
short of proclamation
in state statutes or confession
4
officials.'
One contemporary observer in Georgia reported that the names
of freedmen seemed to be "nailed to the bottom" of the boxes from
which venires were drawn.' As late as the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court was required to declare unconstitutional
such flagrantly discriminatory devices as the color-coding by race
of tickets placed in the box for jury selection.. and selection
from among the friends and acquaintances of white jury commissioners.'
In 1940, the Carnegie Foundation study of the Negro in
America supervised by Gunnar Myrdal discovered that AfricanAmericans frequently served on juries in larger Southern cities
and in Southern federal courts. Nevertheless, "the vast majority
of rural courts in the Deep South... made no pretense of putting Negroes on jury lists, much less calling or using them in
trials."45
In the summer of 1955 in Money, Mississippi, Emmett Till, a
fourteen-year-old African-American visitor from Chicago, accepted a dare to speak to a white woman. "Bye, Baby," he said. Several days later, Till's mangled body was discovered in the
Tallahatchie River. Roy Bryant, the husband of the white woman, and J. W. Milam, the woman's brother, were charged with
Till's murder. The principal evidence against them was the testimony of an African-American, Mose Wright. Following the
defendants' acquittal by an all-white jury, they sold their story to
a journalist for $4,000. Bryant and Milam explained that they

14

Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law 253-72 (AMS

Press, 1969).
141 Schmidt, 61 Tex L Rev at 1406. The exclusion of African-Americans from jury
service was of course only one part of a pervasive regime of racial subordination, a regime

that included equally flagrant abrogation of the Fifteenth Amendment right of AfricanAmericans to vote.
14 Foner, Reconstructionat 595 (cited in note 138).
1
See Avery v Georgia,345 US 559, 562-63 (1953).
4
See Cassell v Texas, 339 US 282, 290 (1950); Hill v Texas, 316 US 400, 402 (1942).
'" Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modem Democracy 549-50 (Harper and Row, 2d ed 1962), quoting Arthur Raper, Race and Class Pressures
79, 80 (1940) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Myrdal's study).
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had meant merely to frighten Till but "had" to kill him when he
refused to beg for mercy. The incident focused the nation's attention on both Southern racism and Southern juries. 46
In 1957, Jack B. Weinstein surveyed lawyers in Northern
and Southern cities. The lawyers reported that although AfricanAmericans did serve on petit juries, they had never been known
to serve on grand juries in San Francisco and St. Paul. 47 In
Chicago, prosecutors and defense attorneys had only recently
abandoned their agreement to use peremptory challenges to dismiss all African-American jurors.'48
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Constitution does not require random jury selection. For example, in 1970
the Court upheld the constitutionality of an Alabama requirement that jurors be "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and.., esteemed in the community for their integrity, good
character and sound judgment. " ' Nevertheless, beginning in
1935, in cases in which blacks had not within memory served on
a county's grand or petit juries, the Court has permitted inferences of unconstitutional discrimination to be drawn from inadequately explained disparities between the composition of jury
panels and county populations. 5 ' The Court's statistical standards have grown increasingly demanding. 5 '
Even when jury panels were lawfully chosen, one form of
undisguised discrimination against African-Americans persisted
until 1986. In 1965, in Swain v Alabama,5 ' the Supreme Court
afforded prosecutors and defense attorneys virtually unrestricted

"'
See Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965 3957 (Viking, 1987).
147 Weinstein's study is described in Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American

Law 328-29, 405-12 (Columbia, 1959). In many places, grand jurors were selected by
commissioners and judges in a more informal manner than petit jurors, and in some
places, se~vice on a grand jury was something of a social honor. See, for example, Robert
A. Carp, The Harris County Grand Jury-A Case Study, 12 Houston L Rev 90, 93-97

(1974).
1.

Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law at 406-07.

149 Carter v Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 US 320, 331, 335-37 (1970). See

also Turner v Fouche, 396 US 346, 354-55 (1970) (upholding a Georgia law allowing jury
commissioners to eliminate anyone found not "upright" and "intelligent").
1" See Norris v Alabama, 294 US 587, 591-93 (1935). Norris was the second prosecution of one of the Scottsboro boys. For the story of the first prosecution, see Powell v
Alabama, 287 US 45 (1932). See also Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro:A Tragedy of the American South (Louisiana State, 1969); James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro (Pantheon,
1994).
'6' See Turner, 396 US at 357-60; Alexander v Louisiana, 405 US 625, 629-32 (1972);
Castaneda v Partida,430 US 482, 488 n 8, 495-98 (1977).
152

380 US 202 (1965).
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discretion to eliminate African-Americans through the use of
peremptory challenges. In Swain, an all-white jury in Talledega
County, Alabama, had convicted a nineteen-year-old black man of
raping a seventeen-year-old white woman and had sentenced him
to death. Since at least 1950, no African-American had served on
a civil or criminal jury in Talledega County, and in Swain, the
prosecutor used six peremptory challenges to remove from the
jury panel the only six African-Americans eligible to serve." 3
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court affirmed
the defendant's conviction and sentence. It recognized that the
use of peremptory challenges "for reasons wholly unrelated to the
outcome of the particular case... [simply] to deny the Negro the
[ I right and opportunity to participate in the administration of
justice" would be unconstitutional, but the Court held that the
prosecutor's exclusion of all potential African-American jurors did
not establish the proscribed motivation.1
In 1986, the Court overruled Swain in Batson v Kentucky,
holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate African-Americans on the basis of race (even for strategic,
trial-related reasons) violated the Equal Protection Clause.155
The enforcement mechanism created by the Court was cumbersome, however, and the decision left a number of apparent loopholes. 5 In 1991, the Court closed one of these loopholes, holding that a defendant need not be a member of the same race as
an excluded juror to challenge this juror's exclusion.'57 In 1992,
the Court closed another, holding that the exclusion of AfricanAmericans by defense attorneys as well as by prosecutors violated the Equal Protection Clause.'58 Other apparent loopholes remain, however, and the history of efforts to secure an equal place
in the jury box for Americans of African descent is not yet concluded.9
13 Id at 205.07.
154

*
,
158
15

Id at 224, 226.
476 US 79, 97 (1986).
See Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 167-211 (cited in note 84).
See Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 416 (1991).
See Georgia v McCollum, 112 S Ct 2348, 2354-56 (1992).
For example, Batson's requirement of nondiscrimination is satisfied by the articula-

tion of a plausible nonracial reason for exclusion, Batson, 476 US at 97, and the invention
of such a reason does not seem difficult. One federal court has upheld the exclusion of an
African-American juror for failing to maintain eye contact with a prosecutor, see United
States v Cartlidge, 808 F2d 1064, 1070-71 (5th Cir 1987), while another has upheld the
exclusion of an African-American for staring at the prosecutor too long. See United States
v Mathews, 803 F2d 325, 330-31 (7th Cir 1986). Still another court has accepted the explanation that the government struck a prospective juror because he strongly favored civil
rights. See United States v Payne, 962 F2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir 1992).
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C. Women
Long after Strauder v West Virginia held the exclusion of
African-American men from jury service unconstitutional, the
statutory exclusion of women persisted. Linda K. Kerber is preparing a history of American women's halting progress toward
equal citizenship in voting, in military service, and on juries,'O
and Kerber has shared some of her research with us. The remainder of this Section is, in essence, a preview of part of her
important work.
Even before the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920, women voted and served on juries in several states."6 '
The first jury service by women in America (and, indeed, in any
common law jurisdiction) occurred in the Wyoming Territory in
1870. This landmark brought a congratulatory telegram from the
King of Prussia to President Grant, but the territory's new chief
justice brought an end to Wyoming's experiment in equality in
the courtroom within two years.'62 Women continued to vote in

Devices other than the peremptory challenge also may effectively exclude AfricanAmericans from jury service. One such device attracted international attention when, on
April 29, 1992, a jury composed of ten whites, one Hispanic, and one Asian-American
failed to convict any of four white Los Angeles police officers of misconduct despite the
fact that most of those officers had been videotaped kicking and beating Rodney King, an
African-American suspect, as he lay on the ground. A change of venue from Los Angeles
County to Ventura County, California, almost certainly accounted for the absence of any
African-Americans on the jury. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Wrong Place, Wrong Jury, NY
Times 23 (May 9, 1992); David Margolick, As Venues Are Changed, Many Ask How Important a Role Race Should Play, NY Times 7 (May 23, 1992). The Ventura County jury's
action triggered two days of rioting in Los Angeles that cost fifty-eight lives and nearly a
billion dollars in property damage. See Seth Mydans, After the Riots, NY Times A20 (May
14, 1992); Neal R. Peirce, Look Homeward, City ofAngels, 24 Nat J 1250 (May 23, 1992).
Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles voiced the sentiment of many Americans when
he said of the videotape, "We saw what we saw, and what we saw was a crime." Bill
Boyarsky, Ashes of a Mayor's Dream, LA Times B2 (May 1, 1992). For a thoughtful debate
concerning the merits of the jury's verdict, see Roger Parloff, Maybe the Jury was Right,
Am Lawyer 7 (June, 1992); Terence Moran, For Simi Valley Jurors, Cop Credibility was a
Given, NJ L J 17 (June 15, 1992); Roger Parloff, That Jury in CaliforniaStill May Have
Been Right, NJ L J 15 (July 6, 1992).
A federal court jury composed of nine whites, two African-Americans, and one
Hispanic later convicted two of the officers involved in the beating of violating Rodney
King's civil rights. See Jim Newton, Racially Mixed Jury Selected for King Trial, LA
Times Al (Feb 23, 1993); Jim Newton, Koon, Powell Get 2* Years in Prison, LA Times Al
(Aug 5, 1993).
10 See Linda K. Kerber, 'A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like... Ladies':
Women, Civic Obligationand Military Service, 1993 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 95.
16. Kerber lists Utah, Washington, Kansas, and New Jersey. In some states, women
voted but did not serve on juries.
1" Grace Raymond Hebard, The First Woman Jury, 7 J Am Hist 1293, 1301-04, 132526 (1913). A cartoon depicting the first women jurors was accompanied by the jingle,
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Wyoming, and when the territory was admitted to statehood in
1890, the state constitution proclaimed both that "male and female citizens.., shall equally enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges"" 3 and that "political rights and
privileges... shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or
any circumstance or condition whatsoever. .. .""' Nevertheless, women did not again serve on juries in Wyoming until the
1940s.'6 5

Just as the Fifteenth Amendment afforded African-Americans the vote without guaranteeing them the right to serve on
juries, the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised women and did
no more. In many states, jury-qualification statutes described
jurors in part as "electors." Once the Nineteenth Amendment had
made women "electors," they therefore became jurors as well.'
In 1925, however, the Illinois Supreme Court balked at this
straightforward reading of the state's jury-qualification statute.
The court observed that when the Illinois General Assembly had
used the words "legal voters" and "electors" in 1874, those words
included only men. If the General Assembly now wished to include women, it would be required to say so.6 7 The legislature
did say so-fourteen years later.'6 8
In other states, jury qualification statutes did not use the
shorthand term "electors." Instead, they duplicated the suffrage
qualifications and so described jurors in part as "men." In these
states, new legislation was needed to enable women to serve on
juries. In 1930, the Executive Secretary of the League of Women
Voters complained that "Getting the word 'male' out of jury

"Baby, baby, don't get in a fury; Your mamma's gone to sit on a jury." Id at 1313.
" Wyo Const of 1889, Art VI (Suffrage), § 1 (Equal Rights).
164 Id at Art I (Declaration of Rights), § 3 (Equal Political Rights). See also Hebard, 7
J Am Hist at 1337 (describing a "woman's convention" that lobbied for passage of these
constitutional provisions).
1
See McKinney v State, 3 wyo 719, 30 P 293, 295 (1892) (holding that only women
litigants have standing to object to the exclusion of women from juries; stating in dicta
that the right to vote does not include the right to serve on juries; and refusing to decide
whether or not jury duty is a "right or privilege").
1
Kerber reports that by 1923, eighteen states and the territory of Alaska permitted
women to serve on juries.
"8 See People v Barnett, 319 Ml1403, 150 NE 290, 290-92 (1925). See also Commonwealth v Welosky, 276 Mass 398, 177 NE 656, 658, 661 (1931) (holding that despite the
enfranchisement of women, the phrase "person qualified to vote" in a state juryqualification statute referred to men alone).
16 An Act to Amend Section 1 of An Act Concerning Jurors, 1939 El Laws 691,
codified at Ill Rev Stat ch 78, § 1 (1941).
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statutes is requiring something like a second suffrage campaign-laborious, costly and exasperating."'6 9
As the word "male" came out of jury statutes, something else
sometimes came in. A 1949 Massachusetts statute exempted a
woman from serving in any case in which the presiding judge
had reason to believe that she would "likely... be embarrassed
by hearing the testimony or by discussing [it] in the jury
room." 70 A 1921 Oregon statute provided that "in all cases in
which a minor under the age of eighteen years is involved, either
as defendant or as complaining witness, at least one-half the jury
shall be women .... "'7'
The most frequent form of special treatment for women was
an exemption from jury service that women could claim on the
basis of sex alone. Kerber reports that the first New York statute
permitting women to serve on juries also permitted exemptions to
be claimed by, among other people, "[a] clergyman... officiating
as such," "[a] practicing physician... having patients requiring
his daily professional attention," "a duly licensed embalmer,"
"[a]n attorney... regularly engaged in the practice of law," and
"[a] woman." 72 In some states, women were not required to
claim their exemption; they served on juries only if they registered at the courthouse or took other steps to volunteer.'73
In Hoyt v Florida,the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a jury system in which women served only if they
volunteered, but men were drafted. 7 4 The year was 1961; John
F. Kennedy was President; and the egalitarian Warren Court declared without dissent, "woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally
impermissible for a State... to conclude that a woman should be

Gladys Harrison, Re-Fighting an Old Battle, NY Herald Trib Mag 10 (Feb 9, 1930).
For a summary of the arguments offered against permitting women to serve on juries,
including the argument that hearing unseemly evidence in court and being sequestered
with men would threaten women's purity, see Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U Cin L Rev 1139, 1166-68 (1993).
0 An Act Regulating Jury Lists and Making Women Liable to Serve as Jurors, 1949
Mass Acts and Resolves 306, ch 347, § 2.
171 An Act Relating to Juries, 1921 Or Laws 513, 515, ch 273, § 10. See also R. Justin
Miller, The Woman Juror,2 Or L Rev 30, 38-39 (1922). Remarkably, the same statute
permitted women to claim an automatic exemption from jury service. 1921 Or Laws 514, §
6 (11).
" An Act in Relation to the Qualifications and Exemption of Women as Jurors, 1937
NY Laws 1171, 1172, ch 513, § 3.
17 See, for example, Taylor v Louisiana,419 US 522, 525 (1975) (striking down such a
provision).
174 368 US 57 (1961).
16
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relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she herself
determines that such service is consistent with her own special
responsibilities." 5 The Burger Court effectively overruled Hoyt
in 1975.76
The last major legal barrier to equal participation in jury
service for women has been the peremptory challenge. In the
early 1970s, a training manual for Dallas prosecutors declared, "I
don't like women jurors because I can't trust them. They do,
however, make the best jurors in cases involving crimes against
children. It is possible that their 'women's intuition' can help you
if you can't win your case with the facts."'7 In 1994, in J. E. B.
v T. B.,' s the Supreme Court held that the equal protection
clause forbids the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of gender. 9

175

Id at 62. Kerber notes that Florida's Attorney General had argued that women's

special responsibilities persisted despite the availability of TV dinners.
'76 Taylor, 419 US at 537.
" Jon Sparling, Jury Selection in a Criminal Case (unpublished, undated manuscript
on file with U Chi L Rev), quoted in Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 210 (cited in note 84).
178 114 S Ct 1419 (1994).
17 J. E. B. was a paternity action in which the plaintiff's lawyer had secured an allwoman jury by challenging men. Reflection on the case suggests how lawyers may sometimes evade the J. E. B. ruling in the same way that they sometimes evade its precursor,
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986), see note 159, and how even well-intentioned lawyers may find compliance with the Court's decision difficult. Imagine that a lawyer in a
paternity action believes, as the plaintiff's lawyer in J. E. B. apparently did, that women
jurors are more likely to favor her position than men jurors, and suppose that this lawyer
lacks any clearer basis for exercising peremptory challenges. Then consider how this
lawyer is likely to use her strikes in the post-J. E. B. period.
The lawyer may (1) conclude that, lacking any salient basis for challenge other than
gender, she will decline to exercise her peremptory strikes; (2) employ a mental quota
system and strike one woman for every man to avoid discrimination on the basis of
gender, (3) employ a different mental quota system and strike two women for every three
men to avoid evident discrimination on the basis of gender; or (4) strike some or all of the
same prospective jurors whom she would have struck before J. E. B. (that is, the jurors
whom she truly wants to strike) while attempting to explain her strikes on a basis other
than gender. For example, if the lawyer selects the least well-dressed men-the ones
without neckties-she may report that her strikes were based entirely, primarily, or
partly on the prospective jurors' dress or class. Declaring that the strikes were based
partly on dress or class would even be true; and unless an unkempt, unexcused woman
remained on the panel, a stronger statement might be credible. Imagining which of these
options (or others) the lawyer would be likely to choose provides a test of one's view of
human (or perhaps just lawyers') nature. To demand genuine gender-blindness in a case
like J. E. B., however, as the Supreme Court apparently did, is probably to demand the
impossible.
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III. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE JURY'S AUTHORITY TO DECIDE

ISSUES OF LAW

A. The Separation of Law and Fact in England
In 1628, Chief Justice Coke described the basic division of
authority between English judges and juries: Judges do not answer questions of fact; juries do not answer questions of law. 80
Coke's declaration did not entirely settle the issue. Twentyone years after his pronouncement, John Lilburne, on trial for
treason, requested permission to address the jury on issues of
law. The presiding justice, Lord Keble, cited Coke and denied
Lilburne's request. Lilburne, the most prominent of the "Levellers," then denounced Keble and other English judges as "Norman intruders." 8 ' He declared, "The jury by law are not only
judges of fact, but of law also ...

182

Lilburne cited no authority for this proposition, and according to a prominent historian of the English jury, Thomas A.
Green, there was none." Lilburne in fact asserted several apparently nonexistent rights during his trial, and Lord Keble ridiculed his pro se representation: 'You have spent a little time, but
you have done yourself no good; I thought you had understood
the law better than I see you do." 8 4
Lilburne, however, had done himself a great deal of good.
The jury acquitted him in less than an hour. Bonfires, the ringing of church bells, and much eating and drinking marked the
public celebration of his acquittal. Shortly after Lilburne's victory, a medal appeared bearing the names of the jurors in his case
and Lilburne's portrait. The medal was inscribed, "John Lilburne,
saved by the power of the Lord and the integrity of his jury, who
are judge of law as well as fact." 85
Two years later, Parliament ordered Lilburne's banishment,
and two years after that, Lilburne defied Parliament by return11oSir Edward Coke, 1 The FirstPart of the Institutes of the Laws of England Lib 2,
Cap 12 § 234 at 155(b) (Hargrave and Butler, 16th ed 1809) ("Ad questionem facti non
respondent judices... ad questionem juris non respondent juratores."). Coke invoked this
formula on several occasions, once erroneously attributing it to Bracton's thirteenth
century treatise. The formula apparently took shape in the sixteenth century. See James
B. Thayer, "Law and Fact"in Jury Trials, 4 Harv L Rev 147, 148-49 (1890).
...Green, Verdict According to Conscience at 173 (cited in note 1). It had, after all,
been only 583 years since the Norman Conquest.
18 Id.
'
Id at 175.
18 Id at 174.
1
Id at 175-76.
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ing to London. Placed on trial for this act, Lilburne again argued
that the jury should judge both law and fact. He pleaded that his
banishment and indictment were invalid. Once more a jury acquitted. Shortly after his acquittal, Lilburne became a Quaker.
His views of the jury's law-finding powers were championed by
Quakers and others in the decades that followed, but they never
gained official acceptance.'
B. The Authority of American Juries to Judge Both Fact and
Law
In England, although juries may have often disregarded the
instructions of judges, they never acquired de jure authority to do
so. In America following the Revolution, however, the authority
of juries to resolve legal issues was frequently confirmed by constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions.
When and how American juries gained their authority to
resolve questions of law is obscure." 7 Indeed, the question of
the jury's authority to decide legal questions seems barely to
have been noticed until it arose in eighteenth-century political
cases in which juries defied English authority.' When, however, Andrew Hamilton declared during the Zenger trial that
juries "have the right... to determine both the law and the
fact," he insisted that this authority was "beyond all dispute." 9
Hamilton's position probably reflected established practice in at
least some colonies.
In England during the American colonial period, judges considered themselves the members of a learned profession, and others, including jurors, generally perceived them in this way too.
Few trained lawyers and little law were to be found in the colonies, however,"9° and the American jury's power to resolve
8

Id at 192-99. In 1771, Edmund Burke ridiculed the claim-still asserted in libel

cases-that jurors should judge questions of law. Burke thought it preposterous for a juror
to tell a judge, 'You are so grossly ignorant, that I, fresh from my hounds, from my
plough, my counter, or my loom, am fit to direct you in your own profession." Burke,
Speech on the Powers of Juries in Prosecutionsfor Libels, in 7 Works of Edmund Burke at
105, 119 (cited in note 42).
18 A
statute of the Plymouth Colony in 1623 declared that "all criminal
facts ... should [be tried] by the verdict of twelve Honest men to be Impanelled by
Authority in forme of a Jury upon their oaths." Quoted in Murrin, Magistrates,Sinners,
and a PrecariousLiberty at 157 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added).
18

In the main, American colonists seemed substantially less interested in the powers

of juries in the seventeenth century than in the eighteenth, when juries took a more
active political role. See notes 15, 17.
1
See text accompanying note 29.
1
See, for example, John M. Murrin, The Legal Transformation:The Bench and Bar
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questions of law may have arisen largely from this circumstance.
In the absence of law books and law-trained judges, jurors may
have seemed about as well suited to resolve legal issues as anyone else. 9 '
The Earl of Bellomont reported to the English Government
in 1699 that judges in colonial Rhode Island "give no directions to
the jury nor sum up the evidence to them."'92 Rhode Island
judges apparently began offering instructions on the law only in
about 1833. 'g The judges formerly had been employed "not for
the purpose of deciding causes.., but merely to preserve order,
and see that the parties had a fair chance with the jury."'94
In civil cases in seventeenth-century Connecticut, the customary division of authority between judge and jury was recognized in form but disregarded in fact.' Bruce H. Mann's study
of these cases concluded:
There is no indication that judges instructed juries on the
law to apply, although by the end of the century judges may
have made a general charge to identify for the jury the questions they were to consider .... There were no issues to be
"framed" for the jury because the entire dispute was within
the province of the jury. 95
In Massachusetts, although judges sometimes did offer jurors
their views of the law, jurors were entitled to disregard these
views, and they often did. 9 ' Indeed, until the early nineteenth
century, the trial bench in Massachusetts typically consisted of at

of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in Stanley N. Katz and John M. Murrin, eds,
Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development 540 (Knopf, 3d ed 1983).
191 Moreover, Americans seemed suspicious of professional lawyers even when few
lawyers were to be found in the colonies. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641
prohibited anyone from accepting a fee to assist another in court. Although the legislature
omitted this provision from its Code of 1648, it later, in 1663, prohibited any "usual and
Common Attorney in any Inferior Court" from serving in the legislature. Id at 541-42.
192 Quoted in Amasa M. Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System in Rhode
Island, 14 Yale L J 148, 153 n * (1905).
1"3 Amasa Eaton drew this conclusion from a statement made by the trial judge to the
jury in the murder trial of Ephraim K. Avery in 1833: "Until the statute, passed within a
few years, making it the duty of the presiding judge to charge the jury upon the law, no
court in this state had adopted the practice of instructing the jury. .. ." Eaton explained
that prior to 1833 the judge, "if a layman," was unlikely to instruct the jury because "he
did not know how to." Id.
194 Daniel Chipman, quoted in Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal
Law, 52 Harv L Rev 582, 591 (1939).
1 Mann, Neighbors and Strangers at 70 (cited in note 2).
19 Id at 74, 85.
'9

See Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law at 3, 13-35 (cited in note 2).
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least three judges. When these judges offered conflicting opinions
of the law, jurors had little choice but to resolve legal issues for
themselves. 9 '
Nine of the eleven judges who sat on the Superior Court of
Massachusetts between 1760 and 1774 had not practiced law,
and six of these nine had no legal training.'99 Chief Justice
Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts confessed in 1771, "I never
presumed to call myself a Lawyer .... The most I could pretend
to was when I heard the Law laid on both sides to judge which
was right."2'e
The first lawyer ever to serve on the Vermont Supreme
Court took his seat in 1787.01 A few years earlier, only one of
the three justices of the Superior Court of New Hampshire had
any legal training; the other judges of this court were a clergyman and a physician.0 2 Immediately after the Revolution, the

Supreme Court of New Jersey consisted of one judge, a layman.03 From 1814 to 1818 a blacksmith sat on the highest
court of Rhode Island, and from 1819 to 1826 a farmer was the
court's chief justice. 4
Even when capable and knowledgeable lawyers appeared on
the bench, they sometimes had limited access to law. Chancellor
James Kent said of his early judicial service in New York, "There

'98 Id at 3.
199

Id at 33.

o Letter of Thomas Hutchinson to John Sullivan, March 29, 1771, quoted in L.
Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, Introduction,in L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel,
eds, 1 Legal Papersof John Adams xli (Belknap, 1965).
"o Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 126 (Simon and Schuster, 2d
ed 1985).
Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 113 (Marshall Jones, 1921).
John Whitehead, The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 3 Green Bag 401, 402 (1891).
Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law at 113. In New York in 1763, fifty-nine
percent of the justices of the peace had no legal training, and some were illiterate.
Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforcement at 175 (cited in note 71). In early eighteenthcentury Massachusetts:
the regular practice of law fell to a host of "pettifoggers" whose conduct easily confirmed the province's direst fears that life for the lawyers would mean death for the
law. In Hampshire County, an ex-tailor, Cornelius Jones, outraged the court with his
unmatched talent for postponing the execution of justice. In York County, the few
regular attorneys were in some cases barely literate .... Lack of numbers among the
skilled and lack of skill among the numbers who practiced law left a vacuum which
gentlemen amateurs often filled in individual cases, perhaps most often as favors for
their friends. A few ministers accepted occasional cases for members of their congregations.
Murrin, The Legal Transformation at 544 (citations omitted) (cited in note 190).
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were no reports or state precedents ....
We had no law of our
20 5
own and nobody knew what [it] was."
Although the authority of American juries to judge questions
of law may have arisen from haphazard practice at a time when
most judges lacked legal training, this power of the jury became
a symbol of trust in the public's sense of justice. A farmer justice
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court instructed a jury to use
common sense rather than the common law, saying that "[a] clear
head and an honest heart are [worth] more than all the law of
the lawyers."" 6 In 1771, John Adams called it "an Absurdity to
suppose that the Law would oblige fjurors] to find a Verdict according to the Direction of the Court, against their own Opinion,
Judgment, and Conscience."2 7
C. The Contest Over the Jury's Authority to Decide Issues of
Law
Following the Revolution, John Adams's view of the jury was
increasingly challenged. John Langbein has written:
In the first decades of American independence there occurred a titanic struggle about the character of American
law .... Arrayed on one side were people who were hostile
to lawyers and to legal doctrine. They viewed the legal system as serving an essentially arbitral function: Ordinary
people, applying common sense notions of right and wrong,
could resolve the disputes of life .... Opposing this vision of
folk law were those who understood that the intrinsic complexity of human affairs begets unavoidable complexity in
legal rules and procedures. With legal complexity comes
legal professionalism.0 8
No issue focused the struggle between professional and popular
justice more sharply than the power of the jury to resolve questions of law. Both sides scored victories on this issue from the
early days of the Republic through the end of the nineteenth
century. It was only during the second half of this century in fact
'
Quoted in Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law at 113. Kent's claim may have
been exaggerated, see John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the Historyof Legal Literature, 93 Colum L Rev 547, 571 n 117 (1993), but written opinions and law reports were
rare in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America. See id at 571-84.
See Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic 115 (Oxford, 1971).
Wroth and Zobel, eds, 1 Legal Papersof JohnAdams at 230 (cited in note 200).
Langbein, 93 Colum L Rev at 566 (cited in note 205) (footnote omitted).
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that the champions of legal professionalism gained clear ascendancy.
The United States Supreme Court's last jury trial occurred
early in its history, before the end of the eighteenth century.2 "9
In 1794 (in the second of the Court's three jury trials), a special
jury was impanelled to hear part of the proceedings in Georgia v
2 1 ° Chief Justice John Jay secured the
Brailsford.
approval of his
fellow justices for the charge that he delivered to the Brailsford
jurors."' This charge declared, "[Ilt is presumed that juries are
the best judges of the facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable,
that the court are the best judges of the law . ... "212 Jay emphasized, however, that jurors could disregard this presumption:
"It must be observed, that by the same law, which recognizes this
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a
right to take upon yourselves to judge of both,
and to determine
213
the law as well as the fact in controversy."
Chief Justice John Marshall's charge to the jury in the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807 declared:
The jury have now heard the opinions of the court on the
law of the case. They will apply that law to the facts and
will find a verdict of
guilty or not guilty as their own con214
sciences may direct.
By 1835, sentiment had changed sufficiently that Justice
Joseph Story, sitting as a trial judge, could expressly reject a
lawyer's argument that "the jury are the judges of the law as
well as of the fact." On this question, Story declared that he had
maintained "a decided opinion during [his] entire professional
career."2" 5 Although Story recognized that the jury's general
verdict was "compounded [both] of law and of fact," he denied:

Hampton L. Carson, 1 The History of the Supreme Court of the United States 169
n1 (Ziegler, 3d ed 1902).
210 3 US 1 (1794).
211 Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 104 (Little, Brown,
1923).
212

3 US at 4.

213

Id.

Quoted in Sparfand Hansen v United States, 156 US 51, 67 (1895) (emphasis omitted). Marshall's statement that the jurors "will find a verdict... as their own consciences
may direct" could be interpreted as a statement of fact rather than as a statement of the
jurors' legal authority. The jurors who heard Marshall's instructions, however, were
unlikely to have parsed his language so closely. In view of the impeachment of Justice
Samuel Chase by the House of Representatives two years earlier, see text accompanying
notes 217-221, Marshall may have chosen his language with care.
215 United States v Battiste, 24 F Cas 1042, 1043 (D Mass 1835).
214

908
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that in any case, civil or criminal, [jurors] have a moral right

to decide the law according to their own notions, or pleasure.
On the contrary, I hold it the most sacred constitutional
right of every party accused of a crime, that the jury should
respond to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is the
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is
the duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by
the court.216
The Supreme Court Justice whose views (together with the
opposition they engendered) marked the changing role of the jury
most dramatically was Samuel Chase. In 1805, Chase was impeached by the House of Representatives and tried by the Senate. Although most Senators voted to convict him, the vote fell
short of the two-thirds needed to remove him from office. One of
the charges against Chase was that, while trying cases as a Circuit Justice, he had endeavored "to wrest from the jury their
indisputable right to hear argument, and determine upon the
question of the law, as well as on the question of fact, involved in
the verdict they are required to give."217
Chase's response to this charge was ambiguous. He noted
initially that he had never attempted "to abridge or... obstruct"
the jury's power to return a general verdict, a power which he
called "a sacred part of our legal privileges."218 Chase then added:
[I]t is the duty of the jury to govern themselves by the laws
of the land over which they have no dispensing power, and
their right to expect and receive from our court all the assistance which it can give for rightly understanding the law. To
withhold this assistance in any manner whatever, to forbear
to give it in that way which may be most effectual for preserving the jury from error and mistake, would be an abandonment or forgetfulness of duty ....219

Chase's language rejected the view that jurors may properly
base their verdicts on personal inclinations rather than "the laws
of the land," but it did not reveal who would resolve questions
Id.
Articles of Impeachment, Art I, § 3, in Report of the Trial of the Hon. Samuel
Chase App 3 (Butler and Keating, 1805) ("Chase Trial"). See also 24 F Cas at 1043.
21 Chase Trial at App 12. On the jury's power to return a general verdict, see the text
accompanying notes 245-46.
219 Chase Trial at App 12 (punctuation modernized).
216

217
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concerning the law in cases of dispute. Chase's reference to the
court's legal opinion as "assistance" (rather than as the court's
"charge," "instruction," or "direction") suggests that he was unwilling to challenge too directly what the House of Representatives had called indisputable: the authority of the jury to resolve
questions of law.2 ' The Senate's vote on the charge that Chase
had deprived juries of their authority to resolve questions of law
was far short of that needed to remove the Justice from office.
Only 16 of 34 Senators voted for conviction." Before very long,
the jury's "indisputable" authority to resolve legal questions was
frequently disputed in state courts, state legislatures, and state
constitutional conventions. Developments in Massachusetts reveal the attention devoted to the issue:
*

In 1808, the state legislature declared the right of juries
to judge law and fact in criminal cases. 2

*

In 1820, a state Constitutional Convention rejected, on
grounds of redundancy, a proposal to declare jurors the
judges of law and fact. The proposal, it was said, would
merely "establish what was now the law of the land."'

"

In 1836, the state legislature repealed its 1808 statute
that allowed juries to judge questions of law. 4

"

In 1845, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v Porterdeclared
that juries have no authority to resolve questions of
225
law.

Seven years earlier, in debate preceding the passage of the Sedition Law of 1798,
Congressman Robert Goodloe Harper declared, "It was well known that, in this country,
the jury were always judges of the law as well as the fact, in libels, as well as in every
other case." 8 Annals of Cong 2135 (July 9, 1798), quoted in Howe, 52 Harv L Rev at 586
(cited in note 194).
2' Chase Trial at App 62.
'

An Act Regulating the Selections, Empanelling, and Services of Jurors, 4 Mass

Laws 382, 389-90, ch 139, § 15 (1808), quoted in Howe, 52 Harv L Rev at 606 (cited in
note 194).
Journalof Debatesand Proceedingsin the Convention of Delegates Chosen to Revise
The Constitution ofMassachusetts, 1820-21 539-42 (Boston Daily Advertiser, 1853), quoted
in Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 Yale L J 170, 175
(1964).
22 The Repealing Act, 13 Mass Laws 582, 608, ch 7 (1836), cited in Howe, 52 Harv L
Rev at 606 n94.
51 Mass (10 Metcalf) 263, 285-86 (1845).
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*

In 1853, a draft constitution proposed by a state convention reiterated the right of jurors to judge both law and
fact. 6 When another provision of the proposed constitution proved controversial, however, the voters failed
to ratify it.227

*

In 1855, the legislature reasserted the position it had
taken in 1808, declaring once again the right of jurors to
resolve questions of law." 8

*

Later in 1855, the Supreme Judicial Court largely
nullified the legislature's enactment, interpreting it
merely as a codification of the jury's power to return a
general verdict.229

By 1851 at least nine states had declared in constitutions or
statutes the authority of juries to resolve questions of law: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.' 0 In at least six additional states-Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Virginia-the authority of jurors to resolve legal
questions had been established either by judicial decision or by
practice."'
After 1850, however, most of the courts that passed upon the
question concluded that judges rather than jurors should settle
questions of law. Between 1850 and 1931, the courts of at least
eleven states (Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont,
and Virginia) rejected the view that juries should judge issues of
law as well as fact. 2
The event that most clearly marked the end of the American
jury's power to judge legal questions was the United States Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Sparf and Hansen v United

'
3 Debatesand Proceedings of the Massachusetts ConstitutionalConvention of 1853
430-31, 499-500, 504 (White & Potter, 1853), cited in Howe, 52 Harv L Rev at 608-09.
Howe, 52 Harv L Rev at 609.

Id.

Commonwealth v Anthes, 71 Mass (5 Gray) 185, 187 (1855).
Howe, 52 Harv L Rev at 596-613, 614 n 125-26.
2"1 Id at 590-96, 596 n 57. Prior to the Civil War, debate about the jury's law-judging
authority took place against a background of Northern resistance to the enforcement of
federal laws supporting slavery. See note 119.
'

Howe, 52 Harv L Rev at 592-613.
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States." As Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court acknowledged, federal courts in earlier decades often told jurors that they
were to judge both law and fact 4 The Court nevertheless held
that jurors must be bound by judicial instructions concerning the
law. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, the issue was
controversial; two justices filed a spirited and lengthy dissent
from the Court's decision.
Today the constitutions of three states-Georgia, Indiana,
and Maryland-provide that jurors shall judge questions of law
as well as factY6 In all three states, however, judicial decisions
have essentially nullified the constitutional provisions. 7 The
unambiguous rule in other American jurisdictions is that questions of law are for the court to decide. Juries must "take their
law" as the trial judge declares itY
233

156 US 51 (1895).

Id at 89. See, for example, United States v Wilson, 28 F Cases 699, 712 (E D Pa
1830) ("You have the power to decide on the law as well as the facts of this case, and are
not bound to find according to our opinion of the law.... ."). See also 52 Harv L Rev at
589 nn 32-33 (offering a lengthy list of citations to similar instructions).
235 Sparf and Hansen, 156 US at 110-83 (Gray and Shiras dissenting).
See Ga Coast, Art 1, § I, 1 11 ("In criminal cases ... the jury shall be the judges of
the law and the facts."); Ind Const, Art I, § 19 ("In all criminal cases whatever, the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and the facts."); Md Cost, Decl of Rts, Art 23
("In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact,
except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.").
The Oregon Constitution contains this confusing provision: "In all criminal cases
whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law, and the facts under the
direction of the Court as to the law...." Or Const, Art I, § 16. See generally Fauvre v
Roberts, 309 Or 691, 791 P2d 128, 130-31 (1990) (en bane).
' See, for example, Sparks v State, 91 Md App 35, 603 A2d 1258, 1277 (1992)
("[Clase law has made it clear that curious constitutional relic has, through the interpretive process, been shrivelled up to almost nothing."); Conklin v State, 254 Ga 558, 331
SE2d 532, 543 (1985) (quoting the statement of Berry v State, 105 Ga 683, 31 SE 592, 592
(1898), that the constitutional language makes jurors judges of law only in the sense that
they are "absolutely and exclusively" the judges of fact). In all three states, a judge may
direct a verdict of acquittal when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support
the defendant's conviction. In all three states, moreover, judges give instructions to jurors
on the law. In Maryland, the court informs the jury that its instructions are advisory only
when legal issues are genuinely in dispute, Medley v State, 52 Md App 225, 448 A2d 363,
365-66 (1982), and the jury's role is limited to resolving the specific legal dispute presented to it. Stevenson v State, 289 Md 167, 423 A2d 558, 564-66 (1980). In both Georgia
and Indiana, the court tells the jury of its power to resolve questions of law only when
requested to do so by one of the parties. Reddick v State, 11 Ga App 150, 74 SE 901
(1912); Bridgewaterv State, 153 Ind 560, 55 NE 737, 739 (1899). Even then, the court apparently adds that the jury is bound to accept the law laid down by the presiding judge.
Moyers v State, 58 Ga App 237, 198 SE 283 (1938); Carman v State, 272 Ind 76, 396 NE2d
344, 346 (1979).
' See Mortimer R. Kadish and Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A Study of
Lawful Departuresfrom Legal Rules 50 (Stanford, 1973).
'

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[61:867

D. What Was the Issue?
Protagonists in the controversy over the jury's authority to
resolve legal questions shared much common ground. For one
thing, no one disputed "the principle of noncoercion of jurors'--a
principle that Chief Justice Vaughan's ruling in Bushell's Case
had established in England in 1671. 9
This landmark case grew out of criminal charges filed
against William Penn, later the founder of Pennsylvania and an
influential architect of American law."4 Following his public
preaching of Quaker doctrine, Penn was charged with participating in an unlawful assembly and disturbing the peace. The facts
were not seriously in dispute, and the case turned on whether
Penn's ability to foresee the audience's tumultuous response to
his preaching was sufficient to establish his guilt. The jury refused to convict, influenced perhaps by the popular sentiment
that jurors should judge questions of law as well as fact (a sentiment generated in part by the trials of John Lilburne a generation earlier"4). The court then fined the jurors for disregarding
the evidence and the court's instructions. One of the jurors, Edward Bushell, was imprisoned for refusing to pay the fine. He
fied for a writ of habeas corpus, and in a ruling that effectively
ended longstanding controversy over the issue, Chief Justice
Vaughan declared that judges could neither punish nor threaten
to punish jurors for their verdicts. 2
No one in America more than a century later challenged
Bushell's Case, and as Americans debated whether jurors should
decide questions of law, the ability of jurors to disobey judicial
instructions without fear of official reprisal was not in doubt.
Similarly, nineteenth-century disputants agreed that judges
could neither direct verdicts of conviction in criminal cases nor
reverse jury acquittals." They agreed, too, that judges should
Vaughan 135, 124 Eng Rep 1006 (1671).
240 Penn's contribution was especially great in shaping American religious liberty and

a humane American criminal law. See William Wistar Comfort, William Penn, 1644-1718:
A Tercentenary Estimate 172-73 (Pennsylvania, 1944).
21 See text accompanying notes 181-86.
242 See Thomas A. Green's account of Bushell's Case in Verdict According to Conscience
at 200-264 (cited in note 1) and John H. Langbein's account in 45 U Chi L Rev at 298
niO5 (cited in note 1) (emphasizing the doubtful character of Vaughan's claim that no verdict could be declared contrary to the evidence because the jurors might know of evidence
not presented in court; as Langbein noted, the "self-informing character of the jury" had
disappeared long before 1671).
'
See Kadish and Kadish, Discretion to Disobey at 46 (cited in note 238). The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the finality of acquittals under the Constitution's
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not require juries to return "special verdicts" in criminal cases-verdicts that would resolve factual questions posed by the
court and enable the court to determine the legal consequences of
the facts found by the juries. Because special verdicts apparently
would have forced juries into too narrow a factfinding role, the
inscrutable "general verdict" of guilty or not guilty-a verdict
that usually makes it impossible to know whether the jurors
have judged the facts, the law, or the position of the planets-remained unquestioned.'
Finally, the protagonists on
both sides agreed that judges should offer jurors instructions on
the law. In short, the principal point of difference throughout the
century-long dispute was whether judges should describe their
instructions as mandatory or advisory.

provision against double jeopardy. See United States v Ball, 163 US 662, 669-71 (1896);
Kepner v United States, 195 US 100, 129-30 (1904); United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 9091 (1978).
" When a federal district court required a special verdict in the case of Benjamin
Speck and other Vietnam-era war protestors, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that this procedure violated the defendants' constitutional right to jury
trial. United States v Spock, 416 F2d 165, 183 (1st Cir 1969). Other courts, however, have
held the special verdict constitutional in the absence of indications of judicial pressure.
See United States v O'Looney, 544 F2d 385, 392 (9th Cir 1976).
Anglo-American history's most prominent departure from the use of general verdicts
in criminal cases came in the case of Regina v Dudley and Stephens, 14 Queen's Bench
Dec 273 (1884), a case holding that shipwrecked sailors may not kill and eat the cabin boy
no matter how hungry they are. Baron Huddleston encouraged the jury to return a special
verdict in this case because customary procedures would not have yielded the verdict he
sought. See A. W. Brian Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law: The Story of the
Tragic Last Voyage of the Mignonette and the Strange Legal Proceedingsto Which It Gave
Rise 208-10 (Chicago, 1984). Despite the use of a special verdict in Dudley and Stevens
and occasionally in other common law prosecutions, the authorities generally agreed that
"the jury can [] insist on returning a general verdict." Kadish and Kadish, Discretion to
Disobey at 52. Whether juries had the same power to insist on returning general verdicts
in libel cases was a subject of dispute. In 1792, however, Fox's Libel Act declared that in
seditious libel prosecutions, "the jury... may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty
upon the whole matter put in issue... ." The Libel Act of 1792, 32 Geo 3, ch 60, § 1. See
Kadish and Kadish, Discretionto Disobey at 47.
Although judges could not require juries to return special verdicts, jurors themselves
might elect to do so. In Massachusetts in 1667, Bethjah Bullojne was accused of committing adultery (a capital offense) with Peter Turpin. The jury found Bullojne guilty only "of
lleing in bed with Peter Turpin" The court told the jury to retire once more and to return
a general verdict on the charge of adultery, but the jury instead returned with this special
verdict: "If by lawe Bethjah Bullojne lying in bed wth Peter Turpin be adultery wee find
her Guilty: If by lawe Bethjah Bullojne lying in bed wth Peter Turpin be not adultery wee
find her not guilty." The court then sentenced Bullojne to stand on the gallows with a rope
around her neck and to receive ten stripes or else pay a fine of ten pounds. This sentence
was the most lenient imposed for adultery in Massachusetts until 1686. See Murrin,
Magistrates,Sinners, and a PrecariousLiberty at 191 (cited in note 2).
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Twentieth-century American juries, formally bound by mandatory instructions, undoubtedly disregard these instructions
more than occasionally; and early nineteenth-century juries,
formally permitted to disregard advisory instructions, undoubtedly followed these instructions with considerable frequency. Calling judicial instructions mandatory or advisory does not determine how often the instructions are followed. In that sense, the
primary significance of the disappearance of the jury's de jure
power to resolve issues of law may be symbolic. Undisputed procedures-the general verdict, the principle of noncoercion of jurors, and the inability to direct verdicts of conviction-ensured
both nineteenth- and twentieth-century American juries the
practical power to "acquit against instructions." 5 The general
verdict and the principle of noncoercion of jurors frequently ensured the power to "convict against instructions" as well.246
Moreover, the customary phrasing of the issue-whether
judges or juries should resolve questions of law-tended to mask
the question most at issue. This phrasing suggests that the issue
was simply which of two agencies would perform a task that one
or the other had to complete. Jurors, however, are unlikely to
judge law in the same way that judges do. The issue that divided
judges, legislators, and the drafters of state constitutions was not
primarily which agency would perform a task, but what task it
would perform.
A juror instructed to resolve questions of law for herself
probably would not hire a law clerk, learn to use LEXIS, spend
hours in a law library, or even (as nonlawyer judges often do)
consult a statute book or desk manual. 7 She probably would

245 See Horning v District of Columbia, 254 US 135, 138 (1920) (Holmes) ("[Tihe jury

has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts.").
'
It bears emphasis that the ability of jurors to disregard instructions may disadvantage defendants rather than aid them.
247 Ironically, if a juror were to do any of these things, her use of "extraneous" materials might subject the jury's verdict to impeachment. See, for example, Tanner v United
States, 483 US 107, 118-20 (1987) (holding that the abuse of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine by federal jurors throughout a trial could not lead to impeachment of the jury's
verdict, but only because the alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine were not "outside" influences).

Even after abandonment of the jury's law-judging role, nonlawyer judges in American municipal courts, county courts, and justice-of-the-peace courts resolve questions of
law. Abandonment of the jury's de jure authority to resolve legal questions did not reflect
a judgment that deciding legal questions is always such specialized work that only lawyers can do it. See Doris Marie Provine, Judging Credentials:Nonlawyer Judges and the
Politics of Professionalism xi-xii (Chicago, 1986) (noting that approximately 13,000
nonlawyers serve as judges in forty-three states). See also Linda J. Silberman, Non-
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not consider it her duty to do sufficient research to determine
whether the trial judge's charge had misstated the law. Instead,
this juror probably would view the court's instruction as an invitation to do what John Marshall invited jurors to do in the case
of Aaron Burr-to "find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as [her]
own conscience[ I may direct."2'
There are, in short, two kinds of "law judging": "law finding"
and "law intuiting."" 9 Initially, the distinctiveness of these
kinds of decision making and their relationship to the responsibilities of judge and jury might not have been evident, nor even
existent. In colonial America, so long as basic requirements of
impartiality and fair procedure were observed, the identity of the
agency charged with resolving questions of law might not have
mattered much. This' agency-whether judge, jury, or someone
else-would have consulted what was known of the relevant
positive law (typically not much) and then would have attempted
to fill the interstices of this law (typically large) with Solomonlike wisdom and common sense. Which body was assigned the
task would not have greatly affected the nature of the task to be
performed.
As the volume of accessible positive law increased, however,
the tension between the two kinds of law judging probably increased as well, and institutional arrangements could not have
adapted quickly. On occasion, jurors may have been asked to
resolve technical issues of law. Lawyers sometimes disputed
these questions before jurors in more or less the same fashion
5 Still, an entry in John
that they would have before judges.Y
Adams's diary revealed his sense that "jury law" and "lawyers'
law" were not, in 1771, very different:
The general Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society, under which ordinary Transactions arrange themselves,
are well enough known to ordinary Jurors. The great Principles of the Constitution, are intimately known, they are
sensibly felt by every Briton-it is scarcely extravagant to

Attorney Justice in the United States: An Empirical Study (Institute of Judicial Administration, 1979).
28 See text accompanying note 214.
24 See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Criminal Procedure26-27 (US GPO, 1931) ("In a number of jurisdictions juries are made judges
of the law in criminal cases ....The juror is made judge of the law not to ascertain what
it is, but to judge of its conformity to'his personal ideals ....").
'o See Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law at 3 (cited in note 2).
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say, they are drawn in and imbibed with the Nurses Milk
and first Air.2 5'
By the time of the nineteenth-century contests over the jury's
authority, however, it was evident that "judge law" and "jury
law" were distinct. Protagonists on both sides of the issue recognized that judges would study their books while jurors would, as
Adams wrote in the same diary entry, consult "their own Opinion, Judgment and Conscience."2 52
"Jury law" was not book law. Over the course of the nineteenth century, as American society grew more diverse and jury
membership more inclusive (and as the legal issues presented to
the courts grew more complicated), the belief that jurors' consciences would yield sound, shared, consistent answers to legal
questions undoubtedly faded. A declining sense that principles of
natural justice are "drawn in and imbibed with the Nurses Milk
and first Air" surely contributed
to the abandonment of the jury's
2 3
law-judging authority.
E. Some Possible Interpretations
While the question of the jury's authority to resolve questions of law may have been primarily of symbolic significance, the
symbolism concerned the sorts of issues that define a legal system. The disappearance of the American jury's authority to resolve questions of law remains subject to various interpretations.
To members of the Critical Legal Studies movement, public
choice theorists, and Marxists, this development may seem the
21

DiaryNotes on the Right of Juries, Feb 12, 1771, in Wroth and Zobel, eds, 1 Legal

Papersof John Adams at 228, 230 (cited in note 200).
2'2 Id.
' Debates reminiscent of the struggle over the jury's law-judging role recurred in the
1960s and 1970s when anti-war activists argued that judges should inform jurors of their
"right to acquit... without regard to the law and the evidence." See in particular the
exchange between Judge Leventhal and Chief Judge Bazelon in United States v

Dougherty, 473 F2d 1113, 1130-47 (DC Cir 1972).
Even today, President Adams has his followers. The Fully Informed Jury Association, a Montana-based group founded in 1989, has taken as its principal aim the overturning of the Supreme Court's ruling in Sparfand Hansen. See text accompanying notes 23335. It also has persuaded state legislators to introduce bills that would require judges to
inform jurors of their "historical, constitutional, and natural right" to adjudge questions of
law. According to the New York Times, the group has attracted the support of a "strange
coalition" including Operation Rescue, some members of the National Rifle Association,
anti-logging environmentalists, tax protestors, advocates of the legalization of marijuana,
and bikers opposed to mandatory helmet laws. See Katherine Bishop, Diverse Group

Wants Juries to Follow Natural Law, NY Times B16 (Sept 27, 1991); Dick Dahl, Group
Aims for 'Conscientious'Juries,Mass Lawyers Weekly 35 (Mar 4, 1991).
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product of the American legal profession's economic self-interest
(as well, perhaps, as its elitism, political power, and contrived
claims of expertise). Morton J. Horwitz, for example, has described the "subjugation of juries" as part of an implicit bargain
between the legal profession and commercial interests-one in
which lawyers made judicial proceedings more responsive to
commercial concerns and merchants permitted the bar to restrict
the use of extra-legal dispute-resolution mechanisms such as
arbitration.'
But the displacement of jurors by judges in resolving legal
issues is equally subject to a simpler and more benign explanation. Jurors initially resolved legal issues at a time when
lawbooks and legal professionals were in short supply. Although
some people resisted displacement of the jury's power after real
"law" became available, most consumers of governmental disputeresolution services preferred the guidance of legal rules to the
uncertainties of ad hoc community judgments. Commercial interests may have valued the greater certainty offered by professional law, but they were not alone.
There may be elements of truth in both hypotheses 2 5 5-and
in others as well. We have suggested that a declining faith in
natural law, the greater diversity of the jury's composition, and
the increasing complexity of American life played parts in the
story. 6 In addition, Forrest McDonald has noted that, in the
colonial era, American juries were the governmental bodies most
representative of their communities. With independence, state
legislatures and other agencies probably represented the whole
society better. More democratic lawmaking left little legitimate
role for the jury's law-intuiting (and law-defying) functions. The
democratic purposes initially served by colonial juries came to be
better served by other institutions."
'
See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 140-59
(Harvard, 1977).
' That is, the legal profession may have sought to further its economic interests
through the political process, and it may have succeeded because it offered the public
something valuable in return.
2" See text accompanying note 253.
'" See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 41 (Kansas, 1985). Compare Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 188 (1968)
(Harlan dissenting) ("We no longer live in a ...colonial society. Judges enforce laws
enacted by democratic decision, not by regal fiat. They are elected by the people or appointed by the people's elected officials, and are responsible not to a distant monarch
alone but to reviewing courts, including this one.").
A more cynical hypothesis than McDonald's is that American leaders favored antiauthoritarian juries so long as these leaders were resisting the British establishment. The
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Loss of the jury's authority to resolve questions of law can
also be seen as part of a recurring cycle of rejection and return to
law. Roscoe Pound observed in 1913:
Legal history shows a constant movement back and forth between wide judicial discretion... and strict confinement of
the magistrate by detailed rules ....
From time to
time... reversion to justice without law becomes necessary
in order to bring the administration of justice into touch
with new moral ideas or changed social or political conditions.
... [Elven the American colonists, who from bitter experience knew the relation of hard and fast legal rules to liberty,
were wont to pursue an ideal of a rude natural justice dispensed without rule by a jury or by a plain man. Extravagant powers are conceded to juries in many jurisdictions because the application of rough standards of justice and the
appeal to the emotions involved in these powers are strongly
approved by the public .... There are other reasons for this
than intrinsic advantages of such an administration of justice. One reason is a wide-spread popular belief that any one
is competent to administer justice .... . Another is, perhaps,
that exaltation of incompetency and distrust of special competency in special fields which seems to be an unhappy byproduct of democracy.

... When, in certain periods of legal development, some
reversion to justice without law has been necessary,... an
evolution of new rules has always followed hard upon its
heels. 58
The cry that professional law has failed is a usual concomitant of revolutionary movements. At a moment of revolutionary
triumph, the law on the books is always that of the ancien
rdgime, and lawyers generally have been the messengers of that
lawY 9 A revolutionary must often be tempted to proclaim, "The
first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."260 Developments in
leaders had less use for anti-authoritarian juries once these leaders had become the
establishment themselves.
'
Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 Colum L Rev 696, 699, 701, 706 (1913)
(footnotes omitted).
"'
Which is not to say that all lawyers have been the messengers of that law.
20 See William Shakespeare, Henry VI PartII, 4.2.86-87.

1994]

History of the CriminalJury

the United States and elsewhere in the years since Pound's observation illustrate his thesis.
As a result of Che Guevara's leadership and prompting, the
Cuban government established numerous lay tribunals empowered to judge both law and fact following the Revolution of 1958.
The jurisdiction of these community courts was limited to minor
disputes, and like the neighborhood courts of other socialist countries, they appear to have operated largely as socialist theory
suggested they should. The lay people who judged the cases also.
swept the courtrooms, and although the central government supplied these judges with copies of an outdated code, the judges
were encouraged not to use it. Law could proceed-not from the
top of a hierarchy down-but upward from the people of a neighborhood. Both in principle and in practice, the community courts
relied primarily upon education, mediation, and persuasion rather than the use of coercive sanctions to resolve disputes.
Writers on the political left visited the Cuban community
courts and described their proceedings enthusiastically,26 ' yet
today these courts are gone." 2 The people subject to their jurisdiction apparently did not like them much. Courts operating
without law asserted jurisdiction over every aspect of a person's
life about which someone else complained. The "public/private
distinction" (a distinction now disfavored by some American legal
scholars26 ) had faded.2 Well-intentioned rhetoric in support
of informal justice had become a formula for tyranny. In abolishing the community courts, Fidel Castro confessed that these
courts had been a revolutionary excess.265 Some aspects of the
community courts' procedures do, however, persist in today's professionally staffed Cuban courts.266
A more dramatic illustration of law's banishment and return
came when the authors of the Cultural Revolution in China concluded that the nation would be better off without any lawyers at
all. Today, the lawyers whom the Red Guards took from their

"* See, for example, James Brady, The Revolution Comes of Age: Justice and Social
Change in Contemporary Cuba, in Colin Sumner, ed, Crime, Justice, and Underdevelopment 248 (Heinemann, 1982).
2 See Luis Salas, The Emergence and Decline of the Cuban Popular Tribunals, 17 L
& Society Rev 587 (1983).
' See, for example, Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal L Rev
1151 (1985).
See Salas, 17 L & Society Rev at 604-606.
Id at 607.
Id at 610.
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families and sent to the rice paddies are back, drafting new codes
and structuring joint ventures. 7
A less "foreign" example was provided by the American juvenile-court movement of the early twentieth century. In place of
fact-finding juries in boxes and law-finding judges on perches,
parental figures in living-room settings could consider the best
interests of the child. In a juvenile system in which the goal was
helping rather than punishing, adversary battles over the commission of specified criminal acts and elaborate procedural safeguards seemed unnecessary." 8 A half-century later, however,
most observers of the juvenile courts sighed with relief when
decisions like In re Gault269 and In re Winship27 brought sub-

stantially more lawyer's law to juvenile proceedings.
So it was, to some extent, following the American revolution.
The romanticization of popular, informal justice illustrated by
John Adams's remarks about the jury gave way over time to a
more mature, less exuberant acceptance of lawyer's law.
As Roscoe Pound observed, the issue reappears frequently.
With evident agony, some scholars on the left have recognized
the dangers of informal justice; 7' and after an initial period of
widespread scholarly enthusiasm, other scholars have voiced
concern about the procedural informality of mediation and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution. 72 Even as these writers
have voiced their approval of lawyer's law, however, others have
proclaimed that "law is male"2 7 and that a female "ethic of

2'
See Beverly G. Baker, Chinese Law in the Eighties: The Lawyer and the Criminal
Process, 46 Albany L Rev 751, 753-64 (1982); Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, The Re-Emergence
of the Legal Profession in the People'sRepublic of China, 6 NY L Sch J Intl & Comp L 275
(1985).
26
See Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency 137-75
(Chicago, 2d ed 1977).
20 387 US 1 (1967).
270 397 US 358 (1970).
271 See, for example, Richard L. Abel, Introduction,in Richard L. Abel, ed, 2 The Politics of Informal Justice: Comparative Studies 1-13 (Academic Press, 1982). See also
Richard Delgado, CriticalLegal Studies and the Realities ofRace-Does the Fundamental
ContradictionHave a Corollary?,23 Harv CR-CL L Rev 407 (1988).
" See, for example, Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 Yale L J 1545 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 Buff L Rev 441 (1992); Diane P.Wood, Court-Annexed
Arbitration:The Wrong Cure, 1990 U Chi Legal F 421; Richard Delgado, et al, Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985
Wis L Rev 1359.
See Frances Olsen, The Sex of the Law, in David Kairys, ed, The Politics of Law: A
ProgressiveCritique 453 (Pantheon, rev ed 1990); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's
Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame
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care" must replace a male "ethic of rights."2 74 These scholars argue that a more contextualized, ad hoc system of dispute resolution must replace our current system of administering justice
through rules. They sometimes write as though they had invented the issue and as though it had no history.
Our conclusion is not that an "ethic of rights" is superior to
an "ethic of care," that law is preferable to discretion, that the
professional administration of justice is sounder than the popular
administration of justice, or that boys are better than girls. Bleak
House, 75 most jury instructions, and the hearsay rule remind
us of the cumbersome, self-serving law that lawyers are likely to
produce when left to their own devices. The lesson may be, however, that pushing the tiller hard from lawyer's law steers a dangerous course. A mature legal system must blend law and discretion, rights and care, and the professional and popular administration of justice.
Our own legal system, we think, is schizophrenic. It has far
too much lawyer's law in the courtroom and not nearly enough in
the backdoor proceedings that effectively resolve most cases. The
story of this system and its radical departure from the framers'
design is the subject of the final Section of this article.
IV. THE REPEAL OF THE SIxTH AMENDMENT
BY THE
276
COURTHOUSE CROWD

John Langbein has asked whether hippopotamuses are to be
found in New York City. The answer is yes. Some live in the
Bronx Zoo.27 7 Langbein also has asked whether jury trials are
to be found in America. Again the answer is yes. The courts provide specimens for public examination each year. There are even
enough jury trials to keep a cable television network on the air.

L Rev 886 (1989).
" See, for example, Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An
Essay, 95 Yale L J 1373 (1986). The terms "ethic of care" and "ethic of rights" are Carol
Gilligan's. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development 17-19 (Harvard, 1982).
'5 Charles Dickens, Bleak House (Oxford, 1966).
's For the most part, this Section is derived from Albert W. Alschuler, Plea
Bargainingand Its History, 79 Colum L Rev 1 (1979). Although the Section adds some
new data, we have included it mostly to round out the story of the American criminal jury
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and to place the other Sections of this article in
perspective. Readers interested in a fuller scholarly development should consult the 1979
article.
John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of
CriminalJury Trial, 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol 119, 121 (1992).
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Nevertheless, one statistic dominates any realistic discussion
of criminal justice in America today. Ninety-three percent of the
defendants convicted of felonies in state courts plead guilty.'
The percentage of convictions by guilty plea is still higher in
misdemeanor cases. 7 9 Moreover, nearly half of the convictions
in the cases that go to trial are the products of trials before judges sitting without juries."8
The Constitution declares that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury.... ."'

It

also declares that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury... 2 ., 2 Langbein suggests that Americans should replace
the word "all" in these two constitutional provisions with the
words "virtually none." Our system of criminal dispute resolution
differs enormously from the one that the Sixth Amendment was
designed to preserve.'
At the time the Sixth Amendment was enacted, bench trials
in serious criminal cases were unknown. Nonjury trials became
permissible in the federal courts only in 1930."4 Indeed, the

Supreme Court declared in 1874 that a defendant could not "be
tried in any other manner than by a jury of twelve men, although
he consent in open court to be tried by a jury of eleven men." 5
Even in 1791, a defendant could plead guilty. Far from encouraging guilty pleas in felony cases, however, the courts actively discouraged them. Shortly before the American Revolution,
Blackstone's Commentaries observed that courts were "Very
backward in receiving and recording [a guilty plea] ... and will
generally advise the prisoner to retract it .... " Statements

27
Richard Solari, National Judicial Reporting Program, 1988 47, Table 4.2a (US
Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992). In the seventy-five largest counties,
ninety-four percent of all felony convictions are by plea. Id at Table 4.2b.
29 See, for example, Malcolm Feeley, The Process is the Punishment 9 (Russell Sage,
1979) (Although every defendant in the lower criminal court of New Haven, Connecticut,
had a right to jury trial, not a single defendant in a sample of 1640 cases invoked the
right.).
'o Patrick A. Langan and John M. Dawson, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 1988 1
(US Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1990).
1US Const, Art II, § 2.

US Const, Amend VI.
See Langbein, 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 119-20 (cited in note 277).
See Patton v United States, 281 US 276, 298-99 (1930).
Insurance Co. v Morse, 87 US 445, 451 (1874). See also Thompson v Utah, 170 US
343, 349 (1898).
'
William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *329. More than any other law book, the
Commentaries shaped American legal consciousness. One year before the Declaration of
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declaring the reluctance of courts to accept guilty pleas appeared
in American treatises throughout the nineteenth century. 7
John Beattie surveyed English court records at about the
time of the American Constitution and concluded, "Virtually every prisoner charged with a felony insisted on taking his trial,
with the obvious support and encouragement of the court. There
was no plea
bargaining in felony cases in the eighteenth
5
28
century."
The earliest reported American guilty-plea case reveals that
practices on the American side of the Atlantic were no different.
In Massachusetts in 1804, a twenty-year-old black man was accused of raping a thirteen-year-old white girl, breaking her head
with a stone, and throwing her body into the water, thereby
causing her death. When the defendant pleaded guilty to indictments for rape and murder:
The Court informed him of the consequence of his plea, and
that he was under no legal or moral obligation to plead
guilty; but that he had a right to deny the several charges,
and put the government to the proof of them. He would not
retract his pleas; whereupon the Court told him that they
would allow him a reasonable time to consider of what had
been said to him: and remanded him to prison. They directed the clerk not to record his pleas, at present.8 9
When the defendant was returned to the courtroom, he again
pleaded guilty:
Upon which the Court examined, under oath, the sheriff, the
jailer, and the justice [who had conducted the preliminary

Independence, Edmund Burke remarked in Parliament that nearly as many copies of
Blackstone had been sold on the American as on the English side of the Atlantic. Edmund
Burke, Speech on Conciliationwith the Colonies, in 2 Works of Edmund Burke at 99, 125
(cited in note 42).
"' See, for example, John Frederick Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal
Cases 73-74 (New York, 1st Am ed 1824); John C. B. Davis, The MassachusettsJustice:A
Treatise upon the Powers and Duties of Justices of the Peace 232 (Warren Lazell, 1847).
See also Hallinger v Davis, 146 US 314, 324 (1892) ("The [trial] court refrained from at
once accepting [the defendant's] plea of guilty, assigned him counsel, and twice adjourned,
for a period of several days, in order that he might be fully advised of the truth, force and
effect of his plea of guilty."); Green v Commonwealth, 94 Mass (12 Allen) 155, 175-76
(1866) (noting the "well settled practice" of receiving guilty pleas with "great reluctance &
caution").
J. M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 336-37 (Princeton,
1986). See also id at 446-47.
'2 Commonwealth v Battis, 1 Mass (1 Williams) 95, 95-96 (1804) (emphasis omitted).
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examination of the defendant] as to the sanity of the prisoner; and whether there had not been tampering with him,
either by promises, persuasions, or hopes of pardon, if he
would plead guilty. On a very full inquiry, nothing of that
kind appearing, the prisoner was again remanded, and the
clerk directed to record the plea on both indictments' 0
The report concluded that the defendant "has since been executed."29 ' In the only other American decision prior to the Civil
War to discuss the guilty plea extensively, the persuasion of the
court was successful, and the defendant withdrew his plea.29 2
Raymond Moley's 1928 study, The Vanishing Jury,29 reported the percentage of felony convictions "by jury" and "by confession" in New York State for an eighty-eight year period beginning in 1839. At the outset of this period, only twenty-five percent of the state's felony convictions were by guilty plea. In Manhattan and Brooklyn, the figure was even smaller, fifteen percent. Moley charted a gradual increase in this figure to about
eighty percent statewide by the turn of the century, then to ninety percent by 1926.294 In the years following Moley's study, the
figure continued to grow. It is ninety-six percent today.9
As cases of plea bargaining began to reach appellate courts
in the decades following the Civil War, the overwhelming reaction was one of disapproval.
Nevertheless, plea bargaining
apparently became the dominant method of resolving even serious cases in urban America at the end of the nineteenth century
and the beginning of the twentieth-a time when the bondsman,
the ward politician, the newspaper reporter, the jailer, and the
fixer exerted an everyday influence on the administration of
criminal justice. 7 Various crime commissions demonstrated in
the 1920s that plea bargaining had become common, and many of
the commissions indicated that the use of this route to conviction
had increased in the immediately preceding decades. For the first
time, the practice came to the attention of the public. Again the
general reaction-of scholars, the press, and the crime commis-

"'

Id at 96.

29

Id.
See United States v Dixon, 1 DC (1Cranch) Cir Ct Rpts 414 (DC 1807).
2 S Cal L Rev 97 (1928).

Id at 108.
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 1990 Crime and Justice
Annual Report 162 (Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistical Services, 1991).
' See Alschuler, 79 Colum L Rev at 19-24 (cited in note 276).
'4

'

2" Id at 24-26.
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sions themselves-was disapproval."' The Supreme Court did
not uphold the constitutionality of plea-bargained waivers of the
right to jury trial until 1970.299
American criminal procedure has become an administrative
process rather than the adjudicative process it once was. Nevertheless, when jury trial was routine, it was a reasonably summary procedure."° As recently as the 1890s, a felony court apparently could conduct a half-dozen jury trials in a single day.3 '
The intervening century has seen a proliferation of procedures in contested cases and, as a result, an inability to bring
many contested cases to trial. In 1990, the longest criminal jury
trial in American history came to an end two years and nine
months after it began. This trial did not involve financial machinations of great complexity or an army of white collar defendants; the defendants were members of a preschool staff charged
with sexually abusing children at their school. Of the two defendants whose cases reached the jury, one had spent five years in
pretrial detention and the other two years. The preliminary hearing in the case had lasted eighteen months. The trial jury heard
124 witnesses; and after paring down the charges, the judge
permitted sixty-five allegations of molestation and conspiracy to
go to the jury. The jury acquitted one defendant but failed to
reach agreement on the other. When a retrial later the same year
produced a second hung jury, the prosecutor dismissed all remaining charges. The McMartin Preschool case ruined some lives
and cost the taxpayers over $14 million." 2
Although this case was the product of atypical blunders,"3
Id at 26-32.

See Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 753 (1970) ("W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise
be necessary"); Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge
were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.").
' See Langbein, 45 U Chi L Rev 263 (cited in note 1) (describing English practice);
Alschuler, 79 Colum L Rev at 40-41 (cited in note 276).
3"1 Friedman, Crime and Punishment at 245 (cited in note 8) (describing practice in
Leon County, Florida, but noting that trials in Almeda County, California, were longer).
Compare Hyman and Tarrant, American Trial Jury History at 26 (cited in note 3) (reporting that in colonial Virginia "felony trials were held in one day").
' Lois Timnick, Buckey Jury Deadlocks; Mistrial is Declared; McMartin: D-.A Reiner
Says He Won't Seek a Third Trial. Longest CriminalCase in History Comes to an End, LA
Times Al (July 28, 1990); Bruce Buursma, LA Child Abuse Case Ends in Acquittals, Chi
Trib C1 (Jan 19, 1990).
' See Paul Eberle and Shirley Eberle, The Abuse of Innocence: The McMartin Pre-
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over-proceduralization has infected the American jury trial. Prolonged, privacy-invading jury selection procedures, cumbersome
rules of evidence, the repetitive cross-examination of witnesses,
courtroom battles of experts (who sometimes are called
"saxophones" because they play tunes for those who pay them),
jury instructions that all the studies tell us jurors do not understand, and more, have made trials inaccessible for all but a small
minority of defendants.
Lawyers extol our trial procedures on Law Day and at bicentennial celebrations. They tell us later that the courts would be
swamped if we used them. "Practical necessity" requires pressing
the overwhelming majority of defendants to abandon their day in
court.
Robert H. recently spent six months in an Atlanta jail without any formal charges filed against him and without ever appearing in court or seeing a lawyer. On the day that he met the
public defender who represented him, the public defender advised
him to plead guilty. Robert's was one of thirty felony cases in
which this public defender made court appearances that
day-and one of more than five hundred cases that she handled
during the year. Robert followed her advice.
The authorities later realized that Robert H. was not guilty
of the charge to which he had pleaded guilty; through a bureaucratic error, they had confused him with someone else. Despite
Robert H.'s innocence, however, the public defender may not have
given him bad advice. She told him that, if he pleaded guilty, he
could go home that day; and if he wanted a trial, he could have
0 4 Someone
one-after waiting in jail for perhaps another year."
should tell Robert H. about America's recent celebration of the
Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights.
If Paul Lewis Hayes can be located in a Kentucky prison,
someone should tell him about the Bicentennial too. Hayes was a
repeat offender charged with uttering a forged $88 check. The
prosecutor offered to permit him to plead guilty in exchange for
the recommendation of a five-year sentence. Hayes replied that
he was innocent and that he wanted a jury trial. The prosecutor
then carried out a threat that he had made during the negotiations. He returned to the grand jury and obtained an indictment
under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. Hayes was convicted

school Trial (Prometheus, 1993).
' Monroe Freedman, Forthe Poor, CriminalDefense a Matter of Third World Justice,
Legal Times 34 (Feb 11, 1991).
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at trial, and the court imposed the life sentence that the Habitual Criminal Act demanded. In Bordenkircher v Hayes, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the penalty that Hayes had incurred by exercising his Sixth Amendment right.0 5
The Constitution told Paul Hayes that he had a right to jury
trial. The courthouse regulars (including the Supreme Court) told
him that the exercise of this right was a crime. It was in fact a
more serious crime than uttering a forged check. Uttering a
forged check was "worth" only five years' imprisonment. The
crime of standing trial before a jury was "worth" imprisonment
for life.
CONCLUSION

The American right to jury trial now resembles the hippopotamus in New York City. As John Langbein observes, it's a goner.
Unpropertied white men, African-Americans, the members of
other minority groups, and women have taken their places in the
concert hall, but the orchestra has disbanded. The protagonists
on both sides of the nineteenth-century battle over the authority
of judge and jury to resolve questions of law have suffered resounding defeat. Today prosecutors are the judges of law and
fact.
Jefferson thought the jury an even more vital instrument of
democracy than the popular election of legislators." 6
Tocqueville called the jury a form of sovereignty of the people
and a school in which citizens learn their rights.0 7 Only a shadow of this communitarian institution has survived into the urbanized America of the late twentieth century.
One of us recently received a summons for jury duty, then
spent a day with dozens of his fellow citizens in a jury room with
two television sets playing on different channels. One of our
fellow citizens, a taxi driver, reported that he had purchased a
dress shirt for the occasion. Neither this taxi driver nor anyone
else, however, was called from the jury room to offer his wisdom
on matters of importance to the community. Perhaps some of the
people who waited all day in this jury room ended the experience
with the sense of gratification (or inspiration) to which a citizen
who participates in public affairs is entitled. The final sentence of

434 US 357, 364-65 (1978).
See text accompanying note 51.
See text accompanying notes 45-47.
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the information sheet that we received upon reporting for duty
reminded us that we should. It read:
Please be assured that even if you do not serve on a trial,
just by being available you have made it necessary for all
parties appearing in court to revert to a bench trial, settle by
agreement, plea bargain, voluntarily dismiss, etc., thereby
saving the court's time, and making it possible for our system of justice to work. 08°

JurorInformation, Circuit Court of Cook County, Doe No CCL-0524 (1993).

